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THE PERILS OF SELF-DIRECTED IRAS
By Kathryn J. Kennedy*
ABSTRACT
Individual retirement accounts were created in 1974 as taxsheltered retirement savings for employees whose employer did not
offer an employer-provided retirement vehicle. Since then, they have
been used primarily as rollover vehicles, such that amounts
accumulated under employer-provided retirement plans can be
rolled over into an individual retirement account. This Article
examines the perils involved with a rollover IRA owner decides to
invest his IRA assets in non-traditional assets.
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INTRODUCTION
Individual retirement accounts ("IRAs") are now the preferred
vehicle for individuals to use in order to continue tax-exempt savings
for retirement and are increasingly being used to roll retirement savings from employer-provided pension plans.1 At the end of the second quarter of 2018, there was $9.3 trillion in assets in IRAs, which
represents 33% of the total retirement market assets.2 A General Accountability Office (“GAO”) report released as early as 2014 expressed concern about the magnitude of loss of tax revenue from
IRAs due to the use of mega IRAs and self-directed IRAs.3 This
prompted the then-Senate Finance Committee Chair Ron Wyden to
request Congress to re-examine the IRA rules and to make changes
to prevent a small group of wealthy taxpayers from taking advantage of these tax-sheltered retirement vehicles.4 The GAO report
also recommended the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to compile
data regarding IRA accounts that hold nonmarketable securities, for
fear that transactions otherwise prohibited under federal law may be
occurring (referred to as prohibited transactions).5
Until recently, IRS collection efforts have gathered little information regarding IRAs that hold unconventional or alternative assets – such as real estate, precious metals, private equity, and virtual
currency. In this article, reference to such assets will be labeled “alternative assets.”6 That changed in 2015, as the IRS began to require
trustees and custodians of IRAs to report information about these

* Professor of Law, UIC John Marshall Law School. Juris Doctorate,
Northwestern University School of Law, 1980. Special thanks to my research
assistant Robert Reategui for his excellent support in this endeavor.
1. See Sarah Holden & Daniel Schrass, The Role of IRAs in US Households’ Saving
for Retirement, 2018, Vol. 24, No. 10 ICI RES. PERSP. 1, 1 (2018) (indicating that more
than half of traditional IRA households contained rollovers from employer-sponsored retirement plans). ICI is a national association of United States mutual funds
and other investment companies, dating back to the 1940s.
2. Id. at 2.
3. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-15-16, Individual Retirement Accounts:
IRS Could Bolster Enforcement on Multimillion Dollar Accounts, but More Direction
from Congress is Needed (2014).
4. Letter from Senator Ron Wyden to Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew and IRS
Commissioner John Koskinen (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/111914%20Letter%20to%20IRS%20%20Treasury_mega%20IRAs.pdf.
5. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 3, at 1.
6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-102, RETIREMENT SECURITY:
IMPROVED GUIDANCE COULD HELP ACCOUNT OWNERS UNDERSTAND THE RISKS OF
INVESTING IN UNCONVENTIONAL ASSETS (2016).
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alternative assets. In its instructions to the tax forms (i.e., Forms 1099R and 5498 used to report and disclose information about the IRA),
the IRS now requires special coding to report IRA assets that do not
have a readily available fair market value, such as: stock, other ownership interest in a corporation, or short- or long-term debt obligations, not readily tradable on an established securities market; ownership interest in a limited liability company (“LLC”), partnership,
trust, or similar entity (unless the interest is traded on an established
securities market); real estate; option contracts or similar products
not offered for trade on an established option exchange; or other assets that do not have a readily available fair market value.7 Presumably, such data will better enable the IRS to target audits of IRAs that
improperly value their assets (as a readily fair market value is not
available) and that engage in prohibited transactions. Given the current size of the IRAs’ holdings, they will continue to be subject to IRS
scrutiny.
In a more recent 2016 report issued by the GAO, it made recommendations to the Commissioner of the IRS to do more in educating
IRA owners of the potential dangers that exist when investing in alternative assets, as such investments may involve prohibited transactions. As such, the IRA owner risks losing the tax-advantaged status of the account; increased income tax liability; ongoing tax liability
that may be owed by the IRA if the IRS owner invests in active businesses or debt-financed properties; and the need to provide updated
fair market value information for tax reporting purposes.8 In the selfdirected context, trustees and custodians of IRAs routinely set forth
in the sell letter that they will not review the merits or legality of any
investment made by the account holder, and that the account holder
will hold the trustee or custodian harmless and without liability if
the investment later proves to be unacceptable under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) or the Internal Revenue
Code (“Code”).9 Hence, the IRA owner remains responsible for

7. I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CAT. NO. 27987M, INSTRUCTIONS TO
FORMS 1099-R AND 5498 (2018).
8. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 56.
9. See In re Kellerman, 531 B.R. 219, 221 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2015) (noting that the
sell letter between the IRA owner and the custodian makes the custodian’s role clear,
stating “I understand that my account is self-directed and that Entrust … will not
review the merits, legitimacy, appropriateness and/or suitability of any investment
in general, including, but not limited to, any investigation and/or due diligence prior
to selling any investment, or in connection with my account in particular …. I understand that neither the Administrator nor the Custodian determine whether this investment is acceptable under the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act
(ERISA), the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), or any applicable federal, state, or local
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determining the legality of its plan investments, something they may
not be in a position to do.
A very recent 2019 GAO report on self-directed IRAs reviewed
the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) process for granting administrative exemptions from the prohibited transaction rules for IRAs.10 The
report made two recommendations: (1) that the DOL sufficiently
document its internal policies and procedures regarding this process
to ensure effective internal control and greater transparency and (2)
that the IRS and DOL do more collaborative efforts in the context of
prohibited transaction exemptions to provide greater education to
IRA owners, as only 8 of the 124 IRA applications reviewed by the
GAO reflected DOL contact with the IRS.11 The report noted that
there were very few prohibited transaction exemptions that were
sought by IRA owners—a total of 63 between January 1, 2006 and
May 16, 2017—roughly half of which were withdrawn before the review process was completed.12 The most common application involved the sale of IRA assets involving securities or real property;
the remaining involved leases, loans, and extensions of credit.13 One
practitioner critiqued the report as IRA owners rarely use the prohibited transaction exemption process, demonstrated by the fact that
only 48 exemptions have been granted over the past 11 years, and
that the process takes 6 months to 1 year for approval with associated
legal fees in the neighborhood of $5,000.14 This GAO report was in
response to Senator Wyden’s concerns that IRA owners have accumulated extremely large IRA balances invested in unconventional
assets such as non-publicly traded securities and partnership interests.
WHAT ARE IRAS?
IRAs are a creation of I.R.C. § 408, initially designed to provide
tax-sheltered retirement savings for those individuals that were not

laws, including securities laws. I understand that it is my responsibility to review any
investments to ensure compliance with these requirements.”)
10. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-945, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT
ACCOUNTS: FORMALIZING LABOR’S AND IRS’S COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS COULD
STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS (2019).
12. Id. at 16.
12. Id. at 1.
13. Id. at 19.
14. See Mat Sorensen, New 2019 U.S. GAO Report on IRA Prohibited Transactions,
MAT SORENSEN BLOG (Jul. 22, 2019), https://sdirahandbook.com/self-directed-iranews/new-2019-u-s-gao-report-ira-prohibited-transaction-exemptions/.
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offered an employer-provided retirement plan.15 They were fashioned similarly to the defined contribution model, shifting the investment risk to the IRA owner and targeting the level of annual contributions to be made, not the ultimate benefit to be received. Thus,
benefits payable from the IRA were to be based solely on the value
of the account balance upon retirement. The initial maximum annual
dollar limit applicable to an IRA was the lesser of $1,500 or 100% of
pay, considerably less than the initial maximum annual dollar limit
applicable to qualified defined contribution plans sponsored by an
employer, which was the lesser of $25,000 or 25% (now 100%) of pay.
Individuals establishing a traditional IRA are permitted to make tax
deductible contributions to their IRAs, whereas individuals establishing a Roth IRA are limited to making after-tax contributions to
their IRAs.16 Both types of IRAs permit rollovers of funds from an
employer-provided qualified retirement plans, often preferred for
participants and beneficiaries in order to consolidate retirement assets and to exercise greater control over the selection of investments
provided by the IRA.
Alternatively, an individual may establish an individual retirement annuity issued by an insurance company if he or she wishes the
protection of an annuity guarantee so as not to outlive one’s retirement savings.17
These forms of IRAs are generally not ERISA plans due to statutory exemptions under Title I of ERISA.18 As such, they are not

15. 26 U.S.C. § 408 (2018).
16. Traditional IRAs are governed by I.R.C. § 408 (2018), whereas Roth IRAs are
governed by I.R.C. § 408A (2018). Whereas the Roth IRA would appear to be less
desirable than a traditional IRA, it allows all contributions to accumulate tax-free and
all distributions to be tax-free upon withdrawal. Eligibility for a traditional IRA versus a Roth IRA are considerably different.
17. I.R.C. § 408(b) (2018). Such annuities have restrictions regarding the use of
life insurance, nontransferability clauses, no fixed premiums, and maximum annual
premiums.
18. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in various sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). ERISA is the
federal labor law that regulates the establishment and maintenance of voluntary employer-sponsored retirement plans. ERISA’s provisions were codified in title 29 of
the United States Code, whereas the related tax provisions of the Code were codified
in Title 26 of the United States Code. IRAs are exempt from Title I of ERISA, including
the reporting and disclosure rules of Part 1, ERISA § 101(a); the participation, benefit
accrual, and survivor annuity rules of Part 2, ERISA § 201(6); the funding rules of
Part 3, ERISA § 301(a)(7); and the fiduciary standards of Part 4, ERISA § 401(a). This
act may be referred to as ERISA in the text. According to the Department of Labor’s
(DOL) regulations, IRAs are generally not employee benefit plans and thus, not subject to Title of ERISA, unless they are sponsored by an employer who does more than
facilitate the payroll deduction of contributions to an IRA. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(1)
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subject to ERISA’s preemption clause and thus could be subject to
state laws, especially state property laws. This article will not generally discuss the rules applicable to IRAs that are ERISA plans.
There is a heightened interest by IRA owners to self-direct their
investments – but the term “self-direct” can mean many things. Generally, it refers to the IRA owner’s ability to select his or her investments of the IRA beyond those investments offered by the trustee’s or
custodian’s platform of investments. Contributing factors to the
growth of self-directed IRAs include the bear market of the early
2000s, low interest rates, and concerns about mutual fund fees. When
IRA owners invest in less conventional non-publicly traded assets,
such as real estate, precious metals, and private equity, they may be
endangering the tax-favored status of their accounts, thereby placing
their retirement savings at risk.19 The more common types of alternative assets for IRAs include:
•
•
•
•
•

Real estate (e.g., vacation homes, commercial real
estate, rental housing, and undeveloped land);
Tangible and intangible personal property (e.g.,
precious metals, digital money existing in cyberspace such as bitcoin, patents and copyrights);
Energy investments (e.g., oil and gas interest, solar
energy, wind energy, energy-efficient housing);
Equipment leasing (e.g., equipment leased to a
business for a fee and over a period of time);
Farming interests (e.g., lumber or milk and wool
from animals);

provides that “(1) For purposes of Title I of the Act and this chapter, the terms ‘employee pension benefit plan’ and ‘pension plan’ shall not include an individual retirement account described in section 408(a) of the Code, an individual retirement
annuity described in section 408(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (hereinafter
‘the Code’) and an individual retirement bond described in section 409 of the Code,
provided that—(i) No contributions are made by the employer or employee association; (ii) Participation is completely voluntary for employees or members; (iii) The
sole involvement of the employer or employee organization is without endorsement
to permit the sponsor to publicize the program to employees or members, to collect
contributions through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit them to the
sponsor; and (iv) The employer or employee organization receives no consideration
in the form of cash or otherwise, other than reasonable compensation for services
actually rendered in connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.”
19. See Kelli Click, Are Financial Advisors Bullish on Alternative Investments as Part
of IRAs and Retirement Assets?, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/kelliclick/2018/11/29/are-financial-advisors-bullish-on-alternative-investments-as-part-of-iras-and-retirement-assets/#68c956b94330.
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Private equity (e.g., investment in privately held
businesses such as private company stock or interests in limited liability companies (LLCs) or limited
partnerships; and
Promissory notes (e.g., debt backed or not backed
by collateral, such as a mortgage or deed of trust).20

This article will focus on the applicable federal rules that IRA
owners must be aware of when investing in alternative assets in order to avoid disqualifying the IRA and losing its tax-shelter. Other
issues generated by these types of investments include: who maintains custody of the investment; the lack of liquidity of these assets
for purposes of distributing minimum required distributions; the
DOL’s plan asset rules; fair market valuation concerns; and other applicable federal taxes that could be assessed against the IRA.
Requirements of I.R.C. § 408
There are a variety of requirements under I.R.C. § 408 that must
be satisfied for an IRA:
•
•

•
•

The IRA must always be fully vested;21
The account must be governed by a written instrument such that the IRA owner understands his legal rights, as well as the obligations of the trustee
or custodian holding the IRA’s investments;22
Non-rollover IRAs are subject to maximum annual
contribution limits;23
The IRA must be created or organized in the United
States and must be maintained as a domestic trust
or custodianship;24

20. Id.
21. I.R.C. § 408(a)(4) (2018).
22. I.R.C. § 408(a) (2018); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(b) (2020). Normally a trustee is the
owner of the trust, whereas the custodian merely holds the assets of the trust. But for
IRA purposes, there is little difference. Banks generally serve as trustee for the IRA,
whereas financial institutions generally serve as custodian. However, I.R.C. § 408(h)
states that the IRA custodial account is to be treated as an IRA trust provided the
assets are held by a bank, trust company, or other approved entity. Thus, the IRA
custodian is to be treated as a trustee for all Code requirements.
23. I.R.C. § 408(a)(1) (2018).
24. I.R.C. § 408(a) (2018); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(b), -2(a) (2020).
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The IRA trust or custodial account must be established “for the exclusive benefit of an individual or
his beneficiaries;”25 and
The IRA owner cannot use his account as security
for a loan (i.e., pledging the IRA); to do so will result in that portion being deemed to have been distributed to the owner.26

Under I.R.C. § 408(a), an individual retirement “account” is a
“trust,” and the trustee is defined as a bank or other person deemed
satisfactory by the IRS to administer the trust.27 The regulations provide rules whereby a non-bank entity can obtain IRS approval to
serve as a non-bank custodian.28 They reinforce the notion that only
a legal person, (e.g., corporate entity) and not an individual, can satisfy these rules.29 A custodian, in lieu of a trustee, can hold IRA assets. I.R.C. § 408(h) provides that a “custodial account” shall be
treated as a trust (and similarly, the custodian will be treated as a
trustee) to the extent the account is administered consistent with the
requirements of I.R.C. § 408. The duties and obligations of an IRA
trustee or custodian include holding legal title to the IRA assets and
maintaining control and possession of the IRA assets.30 An unresolved question remains whether a bank or custodian can delegate
custody of the IRA assets to someone who is not a bank or an otherwise approved custodian. Additional duties of an IRA trustee or custodian include, for example, reporting accurate fair market value of
all IRA assets in its reporting to the IRS.31

25. I.R.C. § 408(a) (2018); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(b) (2020). As an example of the
exclusive benefit requirement, see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8241079 (July 16, 1982), where
the IRA owners as members of a church wished to invest in church bonds, and the
IRS held that payment of an amount in excess of the fair market value of the bonds
would result in a violation of the rule.
26. I.R.C. § 408(e)(4) (2020). This prohibition clearly applies when the IRA owner
uses his or her IRA as security for a personal loan; what is unclear is whether it extends to pledging other assets of an IRA for a loan to another IRA.
27. I.R.C. § 408(a)(2) (2018).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(d), (e) (2020). See I.R.S. Approved Nonbank Trustees and
Custodians (April 1, 2020).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(e)(2)(i) (2020). In order to demonstrate the non-bank’s
ability to act within the accepted rules of fiduciary conduct, it must demonstrate sufficient diversity in the ownership of the applicant to ensure that the death or change
of ownership will not interrupt the conduct of its business. See Schoof v. Comm’r, 110
T.C. 1 (1998) (holding that an individual cannot act as trustee).
30. See Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(e)(4)(ii) (2020), for examples of activities normally
associated with the handling of retirement assets.
31. See I .R.S. Instructions to Forms 1099-R and 5498, Cat. No. 27987M (Dec. 18,
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Restrictions on IRAs
There are several restrictions on the types of investments that
IRAs may take advantage of:
•
•
•

•

The IRA must prohibit the investment of its assets
in “life insurance contracts;”32
The IRA assets must not be “commingled with
other property,” except in a common trust fund or
common investment fund;33
Investment in collectibles (e.g., works of art, antiques, metal, stamps or coins, alcoholic beverages,
or other tangible personal property) by the IRA will
be treated as a distribution from the account in an
amount equal to the cost of such collectible;34 and
An IRA may not be a permitted shareholder of an S
corporation for purposes of I.R.C. § 1361.35

As will be discussed below, the prohibited transaction rules
themselves do not prohibit certain investments of assets by IRA;
however, an investment of an IRA that constitutes a prohibited transaction (e.g., purchase of an investment from a disqualified person to
the account) will result in a permanent loss of the IRA tax-favored
status.
Contributions to an IRA of property other than cash are generally
prohibited, but distributions from an employer-provided qualified
retirement plan may be rolled over into an IRA, provided the

2018) (requiring “Trustees and custodians are responsible for ensuring that all IRA
assets (including those not traded on established markets or with otherwise readily
determinable market value) are valued annually at their fair market value.” This is
consistent with the regulations at Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(e)(5)(ii)(E) (2020) which requires non-bank custodian applicants to “determine the value of the assets held by it
in trust at least once in each calendar year and no more than 18 months after the
preceding valuation. The assets will be value at their fair market value …”).
32. I.R.C. § 408(a)(3) (2020); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(b)(3) (2020).
33. I.R.C.§ 408(a)(5) (2018); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(b)(5) (2020). There is not a consistent interpretation as to what constitutes prohibited commingling of IRA assets.
The legislative history suggests that the assets of an IRA may not be commingled
with other property except in a common trust fund (i.e., group trust), solely for the
purposes of diversifying investments and that the assets of IRAs may be pooled with
the assets of qualified plans without adversely affecting the qualification of either
type. ERISA Conference Report, Requirements for an IRA.
34. I.R.C. § 408(m)(1)-(2) (2018). Exceptions to the collectible prohibition include
certain gold, silver and platinum coins. See I.R.C. § 408(m)(3) (2018).
35. Rev. Rul. 92-73, 1992-2 C.B. 224.
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custodian agrees to the distribution, with some exceptions. Alternatively, if a custodian is unwilling to accept distributions of property
from a qualified plan, the property received in the distributions can
always be sold and reinvested in the rollover IRA in “an amount
equal to any portion of the proceeds.”36
INVESTMENT ISSUES TO CONSIDER WHEN INVESTING IN
ALTERNATIVE ASSETS
Prohibited Transactions in General
The Code’s prohibited transaction rules are set forth in I.R.C. §
4975, which state that an IRA is a “plan” for purposes of those rules.37
I.R.C. § 408(e) provides that an IRA is exempt from taxation unless it
ceases to be an IRA under two conditions: (1) if the IRA owner or his
beneficiary engages in a prohibited transaction as defined in I.R.C. §
4975 with respect to the account38 or (2) if the IRA owner borrows
any money under or by use of an annuity contract.39 Once the IRA
ceases to be exempt from taxation, it does so retroactively as of the
first day of the taxable year in which either the prohibited transaction
occurred, or the owner borrowed monies under the annuity contract.40 As a result, a deemed distribution is said to occur on the first
day of the taxable year equal to the fair market value of all assets in
the account or annuity, causing the entire amount to be included in
gross income (to the extent the monies are not Roth monies, which
have already been taxed).41 Hence, the consequence for engaging in
a prohibited transaction is severe – tax disqualification of the entire
IRA. In contrast, if the IRA owner pledges the account as security for
a loan, that portion is deemed to have been distributed to the owner,
but the remaining portion of the account may be saved from disqualification.42

36. I.R.C. § 402(c)(6) (2018). See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.402-1(a)(1)(iii) (2020), which regarding the value of such distributions to be at the fair market value on the date of
distributions.
37. I.R.C. § 4975 (2018).
38. I.R.C. § 408(e)(2) (2018). Once an IRA is disqualified under I.R.C. §§ 408(e)(2)
or (e)(4) (2018), I.R.C. § 4975(c)(3) (2020) exempts the IRA owner from the 15% and
100% excise taxes otherwise imposed for committing a prohibited transaction.
39. I.R.C. § 408(e)(3) (2018).
40. I.R.C. § 408(e)(2), (e)(3) (2018).
41. I.R.C. §§ 408(e)(2)(B), 408(d) (2018) (causing the entire distribution to be taxable under I.R.C. § 72, with possible excise taxes for premature distributions under
I.R.C. § 72(t)).
42. I.R.C. § 408(e)(4) (2018).
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For other parties (e.g., a bank trustee or custodian) who have
engaged in the prohibited transaction, the Code imposes a 15% initial
excise tax on the amount involved, plus a potential 100% excise tax
if the transaction is not timely corrected.43 This excise tax is not applicable to a fiduciary to the plan who is acting only as a fiduciary.44
The IRA owner and his beneficiaries are exempt from the tax because
their penalties involve the disqualification of the IRA upon the occurrence of a prohibited transaction.45 The prohibited transaction
rules of I.R.C. § 4975 are enforceable by the IRS, but the DOL has
jurisdiction over the interpretation of the prohibited transaction rules
and the issuance of exemptions to these rules as there are also prohibited transaction rules under Title I of ERISA.46 Hence, while traditional IRAs, Roth IRAs, and Rollover IRAs are generally not ERISA
plans, the DOL does have jurisdiction over them for purposes of the
prohibited transaction rules.
For employer-provided retirement plans, ERISA imposes certain fiduciary duties on plan fiduciaries (i.e., standards of care), including acting solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to
participants and beneficiaries.47 Thus, ERISA sets up the presumption for these plans that the fiduciary is to have no other motive in its

43. I.R.C. § 4975(a), (b) (2018).
44. I.R.C. § 4975(a) (2018) (stating “[T]he tax imposed by this subsection shall be
paid by any disqualified person who participates in the prohibited transaction (other
than a fiduciary acting only as such.”)
45. I.R.C. § 4975(c)(3) (2018) (stating “An individual for whose benefit an individual retirement account is established and his beneficiaries shall be exempt from
the tax imposed by this section with respect to any transaction concerning such account (which would otherwise be taxable under this section) if, with respect to such
transaction, the account ceases to be an individual retirement account by reason of
the application of section 408(e)(2)(A) or if section 408(e)(4) applies to such account.”
46. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed.Reg. 47,713 (Sept. 29, 1978), and in
92 Stat. 3790 (1978), “[T]he authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to issue interpretations regarding section 4975 of the Code, subject to certain exceptions … has
been transferred to the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury is bound
by such interpretations.” The IRS has jurisdiction in its determination as to whether
IRAs and other plans are subject to the Code’s prohibited transaction. The DOL has
jurisdiction in its determination as to whether other plans are subject to ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules and the issuance of exemptions to such rules. But a determination by the DOL that a prohibited transaction has not occurred does not prevent
the IRS from finding I.R.C. § 4975 liability. See O’Malley v. Comm’r, 972 F.2d 150, 15455 (7th Cir. 1992); Thoburn v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 132, 140 (1990). Note: Section 102(a)(iii)
of the Reorganization Plan reserves to the Secretary of Treasury the authority to issue
“exemptions with respect to transactions that are exempted by subsection 404(c) of
ERISA from the provisions of Part 4 of the Subtitle B of Title I of ERISA.”
47. 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2018).
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activities surrounding the plan. The prohibited transaction rules prohibit certain transactions between the plan and a “party-in-interest,”
so as to avoid any conflicts of interest.48 In contrast, the Code does
not impose any fiduciary duties on an IRA fiduciary but does prohibit certain transactions between the IRA and a disqualified person,
similar to ERISA’s requirements. The prohibited transaction rules
under Title I of ERISA are similar but not identical to the prohibited
transaction rules under the Code, as well as the statutory exemptions, and the definitions of certain terms under each vary. Thus, they
are complicated to understand.
The focus of this article will be on the Code’s prohibited transaction rules and definitions, but the differences between the Code’s
rules and ERISA’s rules will be discussed. Both ERISA and the Code
state the prohibited transaction rules in the following contexts: (1)
transactions between the plan and a disqualified person,49 and (2)
transactions involving the fiduciary to the plan dealing with the assets of the plan or transactions where the fiduciary receives consideration for his own personal account.
Disqualified Persons
Definitions
Under the Code’s prohibited transaction rules, a disqualified
person is defined as follows:
•

A fiduciary to the plan (which would include the
IRA owner who self-directs his or her investments);50

48. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (2018).
49. ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules involve transactions between the plan
and a party-in-interest, whereas the Code’s prohibited transaction rules involve
transactions between the plan and a disqualified person.
50. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(A) (2018). See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(3) (2018), which defines a
fiduciary as “any person who—(A) exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (B) renders investment
advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys
or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (C)
has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibilities in the administration
of such plan The U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin., Opinion
Letter 89-03A (Mar. 23, 1989) stated that the taxpayers in question were disqualified
person with respect to their IRAs because they had the authority under the IRAs to
direct investment. Similarly, the IRS takes the position that an IRA owner who personally manages the investments of his IRA is a fiduciary, and thus a disqualified
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Anyone providing services to the plan, including
the IRA trustee or custodian and any investment
managers or advisors;51
An employer any of whose employees are covered
by the plan; an employee organization any of
whose employees are covered by the plan; or an
owner, directly or indirectly, of 50% or more of (1)
the combined voting power of all stock or the total
value of all stock, (2) the capital interest or profit
interest of a partnership, or (3) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise) which is
an employer or employee organization described
above;52
A member of the family of a plan fiduciary, service
provider, employer, or a majority owner of the employer, which is defined to include the spouse, ancestor (e.g., parents), lineal descendants (e.g., sons
or daughters), and spouses of lineal descendants
(e.g., daughters-in-law, sons-in-law) [note that the
siblings and their lineal descendants, such as nieces
and nephews, are not regarded as family members];53
A corporation, partnership, trust or estate of which
50% or more (1) the combined voting power of all
stock or the total value of all shares of a corporation, (2) the capital interest or profits interest of a
partnership, or (3) the beneficial interest of a trust
or estate is owned, directly or indirectly, by a fiduciary, service provider, employer or employee organization, or controlling owners of the business of
the employer or employee organization (but not the
IRA’s family members);54
An officer, director (or individual with powers and
responsibilities similar to those of an officer or

person. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8009091 (Dec. 7, 1979). It also has stated that an IRA
owner who has the option to self-direct the IRA investments but does not elect to do
so, is a fiduciary, and thus a disqualified person. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200324018
(June 13, 2003). It has extended this position in private letter rules to state that an IRA
owner who is not a fiduciary would nevertheless be a disqualified person, although
the statute does not state that to be the case. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 88-49-001
(Dec. 9, 1988); I.R.S. News Release IR-81-37 (Dec. 18, 1981).
51. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(B) (2018).
52. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(C)-(E) (2018).
53. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(F) (2018).
54. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G) (2018).
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director), a 10% or more shareholder, or highly
compensated employee (earning 10% or more of
the annual wages of an employer) of a person described as an employer; employee organization;
majority owner of such employer or employee organization; or corporation, partnership, trust or estate as defined in the fifth bullet above;55 or
A 10% or more (in capital or profits) partner or joint
venture of a person described above as an employer; employee organization; majority owner of
such employer or employee organization; or corporation, partnership, trust or estate as defined
above.56

Thus, with respect to an IRA, one would look to transactions
between the IRA and its owner; between the IRA and fiduciaries of
the IRA (e.g., persons giving advisory services); and between the IRA
and service providers to the IRA (e.g., attorneys, accountants, and
brokers, and their family members).
IRA Owner as a Disqualified Person
In the context of IRAs, would a disqualified person automatically include the IRA owner? While the IRA owner is not listed as a
disqualified person, the legislative history suggests that he would be
a disqualified person as he “created” the account.57 The IRA owner
may not necessarily be a per se disqualified person as he or she may
not be a fiduciary, but in the self-directed context where the IRA
owner personally manages the IRA’s investments and thus has discretionary authority and control over those assets, the owner would
be a fiduciary; and thus, a disqualified person. The IRS’ position is
that an IRA owner who has the option to self-direct the IRA assets,
but does not elect to do so, is nevertheless a fiduciary.58 The DOL

55. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(H) (2018).
56. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(I) (2018). The Secretary of Labor may be regulation prescribe a percentage lower than 50% or 10% for purposes of the above rules.
57. See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2) (2018) (describing IRA owners as “creators” of their
accounts).The statutory language is ambiguous. In drafting ERISA, the House of Representative’s approach would have applied the Code’s prohibition transaction rules
of I.R.C. § 503 (which applied “creators” of certain types of entities to be subject to
the prohibited transaction rules). See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 161 (1974) (Conf.
Rep.).Instead the definitions were set forth in I.R.C. § 4975, but the IRA provisions
were never reconciled before enactment.
58. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200324018 (June 13, 2003).
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expressed a similar view in ERISA Opinion Letter 89-03A, stating
“Mr. and Mrs. Brown are fiduciaries, and thus disqualified person[s]
with respect to their IRAs because of their authority under the IRAs
to direct investments.”59 This begs the question as to whether a trusteed IRA in which the IRA owner had no investment authority
would be a fiduciary to the IRA. But the answer appears to be moot
as I.R.C. § 408(e)(2) clearly states that if the individual for whose benefit the IRA was established (i.e., the IRA owner, regardless of
whether he is a fiduciary or not) “engages in any transaction prohibited by section 4975 with respect to such account, such account ceases
to be an individual retirement account as of the first day of such taxable year.”60
In the case of Greenlee v. Comm’r, Mr. Greenlee was the sole participant and plan administrator for his company profit sharing trust,
and Union National Bank of Pittsburgh was the sole trustee of the
plan’s trust.61 Mr. Greenlee requested the trustee to lend monies to
Tag Land, Inc., a company in which he owned an 18% interest.62 The
IRS held Mr. Greenlee to be a disqualified person for three reasons:
under I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(A) (a fiduciary), under I.R.C. §4975(e)(2)(E)
(an owner of 50% or more of the employer), and under I.R.C. §
4975(e)(2)(H) (an officer, director or highly compensated employee
of the employer), who engaged in a prohibited transaction under
I.R.C. §§ 4975(c)(1)(D), (E).63 The Tax Court disagreed; although Mr.
Greenlee was a disqualified person, he did not use his “authority,
control, or responsibility which makes [him] a ‘fiduciary’ for purposes of the lending of monies.”64 Since the bank as an independent
trustee of the plan made the decision to make the loan, Mr. Greenlee
did not “deal with the income or assets of the plan in his own interest
or for his own account,” and thus did not engage in a prohibited
transaction.65 While some practitioners cite to this case for the proposition that an IRA holder can “relinquish” his fiduciary status relative to his IRA, the IRS certainly does not bifurcate an IRA owner’s
fiduciary status.66

59. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin., Opinion Letter
89-03A (Mar. 23, 1989).
60. I.R.C. § 408(e)(2) (2018).
61. Greenlee v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 394, 395 (1996).
62. Id. at 396.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 397.
65. Id. at 397-98.
66. See The Prohibited Transaction Rules – A Summary of the Important Cases, IRA
FINANCIAL GROUP BLOG (May 4, 2018), https://www.irafinancialgroup.com/learn-
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A fiduciary to the IRA would also include an individual or entity hired by the owner to exercise investment discretion over the
IRA (e.g., a registered investment advisor) and an individual or entity hired by the owner to render non-discretionary investment advice under the DOL’s five-part definition.67 As an aside, the DOL has
been attempting over the past decade, but without success, to expand
the definition of persons and entities that fall within the latter category (referred to as a fiduciary by virtue of rendering investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect
to the assets of the plan).68 The intent behind such expansion is to

more/self-directed-ira/the-prohibited-transaction-rules-a-summary-of-the-important-cases/.
67. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(1) (2020); Employee Benefit Plans, 40 Fed. Reg. 50842
(Oct. 31, 1975) and 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-9(c) (2020); Employee Benefit Plans, 40 Fed.
Reg. 50840 (Oct. 31, 1975) (holding that an investment advisor would be a fiduciary
investment advisor if (1) he or she rendered advice as to the value of property or
securities and was involved in the recommendation as to the advisability of investing, purchasing, or selling such property or securities or (2) the person had discretionary authority or control over the investment of the assets. For those individuals
not having discretionary authority or control over the investment of the assets, the
individual had to satisfy a five-part test: rendered advice as to the value of the property or securities or made a recommendation as to the advisability of investing, purchasing, or selling such property or securities; provided such advice on a regular basis; pursuant to a mutual agreement between the plan and the individual; that served
as the primary basis for the investment decision; and such advice was individualized
based on the needs of the plan). The intent of the five-part rule was to narrow the
number of nondiscretionary investment advisors to reduce the fees otherwise associated with the costs of providing fiduciary service. The DOL has been working on
revising this definition of a fiduciary investment advisor for over a decade in order
to expand the number of individuals covered by the definition. See 29 C.F.R. § 25103-21(a) (2016) 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(g)(6)(ii) (2020); Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946
(Apr. 8, 2016). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in U.S. Chamber of Commerce vs. DOL, 885 F.3d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 2018), vacated the regulations by holding
that the DOL exceeded its authority under ERISA.
68. ERISA § 3(21)(A) defines a fiduciary to the plan as someone who (1) exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control with respect to the management
of the plan or exercises any authority or control respecting the management or disposition of its assets, (2) renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to the plan assets, or (3) has any discretionary authority or responsibility in the administration of the plan. With respect to the second definition of who is a fiduciary, the DOL attempted as early as 2010 to expand the universe of individuals who would satisfy this definition. See Prop. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.321(c), 75 Fed. Reg. 65263 (proposed Oct. 22, 2010). Generally, that proposal sought to
capture anyone (1) rendering “covered advice” (including three groups of advice) (2)
involving four different “covered relationships” and (3) receiving a fee for such services. As a result, broker-deals could have become fiduciaries if they rendered investment advice individualized for the plan or the plan participant. Due to the backlash,
the DOL withdrew the proposal in 2011 and reissued it in 2015. See Prop. 29 C.R.F. §
2510.3-21, 80 Fed Reg. 21928 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015). The regulations were finalized
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impose fiduciary duties and provide for remedies for individuals offering investment advice to participants under qualified retirement
plans (as well as IRA owners), including advice as to whether to roll
monies from an employer-provided plan to an IRA.69 However, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated these rules “in
toto” (i.e., invalidating the rules nationwide unless they were appealed).70 The DOL allowed its right to appeal lapse and the Fifth
Circuit declined to permit other parties to join the case.71 Thus, the
Fifth Circuit’s decision became final on June 21, 2018, reverting to the
original 1975 regulations that defined who was a fiduciary for purposes of rendering investment advice.
Would the IRA owner be considered both the employer and the employer’s employee with respect to the IRA, and thus be considered a
disqualified person by virtue of I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(C)? The IRS has
answered this question in the negative in PLR 8717079. There, an IRA
owner (Individual N) was employed by Company M and a member
of its board of directors. Individual N owned directly or indirectly
less than 1% of the total outstanding stock of Company M and
wished to have the IRA custodian purchase additional shares, such
that after the purchase, Individual N would own less than 1% of
Company M shares. The IRS noted that there was no definition of the
term “employer” for purposes of I.R.C. § 4975 but referred to
ERISA’s term under section 3(5) as “any person acting directly as an
employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to
an employee benefit plan.”72 Using that definition for purposes of
I.R.C. § 4975, an employer is acting as such, in relation to an IRA,

in 2016, with an effective date of June 9, 2017. See 29 C.R.F. §§ 2510-3-21(a), 2510.321(g)(6)(ii) (2020). But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in U.S. Chamber
of Commerce v. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 2018), vacated the DOL’s
new fiduciary rule “in toto,” meaning that the entire rule became invalidated nationwide. The Court’s reasoning was that the DOL exceeds its authority under ERISA,
resulting in an interpretation that was reasonable. As a result, the original 1975 DOL
regulations which set forth who is an investment advice fiduciary continue to apply.
The DOL issued a technical amendment to 29 C.F.R. §2510-3.21, removing the language that was added in 2016 and to reinsert the text of the 1975 regulation. See 85
Fed. Reg. 40589 (July. 7, 2020).
69. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-21(a), 2510.3-21(g)(6)(ii), (2020). Under transitional relief, compliance with certain conditions of related class prohibited transaction exemptions (PTEs) is not required until July 1, 2019. See 18-Month Extension of Transition Period and Delay of Applicability Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 56,545 (Nov. 29, 2017) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
70. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. DOL, supra note 65.
71. Id.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (2018).
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only when it was involved in the establishment, maintenance, or
sponsorship of the IRA. Hence, it concluded Company M was not an
employer in relation to Individual N’s IRA and hence, the purchase
of Company M stock by the IRA was not a prohibited transaction
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A) (i.e., sale or exchange).73
Hence, this would allow a former employee of IBM to invest his IRA
in IBM stock without peril.
IRA as a Disqualified Person
The IRS regards the IRA itself as a disqualified person.74 In PLR
200324018, the IRS reasoned that under the terms of the IRA, the IRA
owner had the authority to make investments (regardless of whether
he did). Therefore, since the IRA owner was the sole individual for
whose benefit the IRA was established, the IRS finds that the 50% or
more of the beneficial interest of the IRA trust is owned directly or
indirectly by the IRA owner who is a fiduciary and thus, the IRA itself is a disqualified person pursuant to I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G)(iii).
In the FSA 200128011 by the IRS, a father owned a majority interest in USCorp, while his three children owned the remaining
shares equally. The father’s IRA and each of the three children’s IRAs
acquired a 25% interest in FSC.75 While each of the four IRAs were
disqualified persons relative to their own IRA because they were fiduciaries, the IRS concluded FSC was not a disqualified person, presumably because all of its interests were held by fiduciaries acting
“only as such.”76 USCorp was a disqualified person relative to the
father’s IRA as the father owned a majority interest. Thus, if a transaction is made for the purposes of benefitting USCorp, the IRA owners would violate I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D); and if the IRA owners’ interest in the transaction because of their ownership of USCorp affected
their best judgments as fiduciaries of their IRAs, the transaction
would violate I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E). Thus, the IRS regards the IRA as
a disqualified person.

73. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8717079 (Feb. 2, 1987).
74. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200324018 (June 13, 2003) (holding that the IRA was itself
a disqualified person as the IRA owner was the sole person for whose benefit the IRA
was established).
75. FSA 200128011 (July 13, 2001).
76. 26 U.S.C. §4975(a) (2020) (imposing excise tax on a disqualified person for
engaging in a prohibited transaction except when the disqualified person is a fiduciary “acting only as such”).
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Family Members as Disqualified Persons
The IRA owner’s family members (defined to include his
spouse, ancestors, lineal descendants, and spouses of lineal descendants) are disqualified persons.77 Bullet five of the list of disqualified
persons noted above states that family members are not considered
in determining whether a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate
that is majority owned by plan fiduciaries (e.g., the IRA owner), but
there is a caveat to that limitation. Under I.R.C. § 4975(e)(5), for purposes of determining ownership in a partnership and trust described
in bullet five, the constructive ownership of stock rules under I.R.C.
§ 267(c) apply (but are limited by the use of the definition of family
members defined in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(F) as described above).78 Thus,
an individual is deemed to own the stock (or capital or profit interest
of the partnership or beneficial interest in the trust or estate) which
is owned directly or indirectly by or for his family member (i.e., his
spouse, ancestor, lineal descendants, or spouses of lineal descendants). For example, if the IRA owner owned 10% of a partnership,
that amount alone would normally be insufficient to make the partnership a disqualified person; however, should his children own 40%
of the same partnership, the IRA owner is deemed to own 50% of the
partnership due to the constructive ownership rules, making the
partnership a disqualified person as it is owned 50% by the IRA
owner.
ERISA’s definition of a party-in-interest for purposes of its prohibited transaction rules is comparable but not identical to the Code’s
definition of a disqualified person.79

77. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(2)(F) (2020) (referring to I.R.C. §4975(e)(6), which defines
family members to include “his spouse, ancestor, lineal descendant, and any spouse
of a lineal descendant” of the plant’s fiduciary, service provider, employer, or owner
of 50% or more of the voting power of stock or total stock of a corporation; capital
interest or profit interest of a partnership; or beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise, which is an employer or employee organization”).
78. 26 U.S.C. § 267(c) (2020) provides: “Constructive ownership of stock. For purposes of determining, in applying subsection (b), the ownership of stock—(1) Stock
owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a corporation, partnership, estate, or trust shall
be considered as being owned proportionally by or for its shareholders, partners, or
beneficiaries; (2) An individual shall be considered as owning the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for his family.” I.R.C. § 267(c)(4), as modified by I.R.C. §
4975(e)(2)(F), would read “The family of an individual shall include his spouse, ancestor, lineal descendant, and any spouse of a lineal descendant.”
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (2020).
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Prohibited Transaction Rules
The Code’s prohibited transaction rules are similar to ERISA’s,
but are structured differently such that alternate interpretations of
the two could exist. ERISA sets forth two different sets of prohibited
transactions in ERISA §§ 406(a) and 406(b), whereas the Code’s set of
prohibited transaction rules are contained in a single set in IRC §
4975(c). The legislative history indicates the intent behind the rules
is to prevent taxpayers from using plans to engage in transactions for
their own account, thereby jeopardizing the assets and the income
before retirement.80
ERISA’s Rules
ERISA § 406(a) states, that except as otherwise provided in ERISA §
408 (the statutory exemptions), a fiduciary shall not cause the plan to
engage in any direct or indirect transaction which consists of:
•
•
•
•

A sale or exchange, leasing, of any property between a plan and a party-in-interest:81
Lending of money or other extension of credit between a plan and a party-in-interest;82
Furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between
a plan and a party-in-interest;83 or
Transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a partyin-interest, of any assets or income of the plan.84

In this article, these four transactions will be referred to as “per
se prohibited transactions.” ERISA § 406(b) (which does not contain
the caveat that “except as provided in section 408,” indicating that
the statutory exemptions should not be applicable), the following
transactions between the plan and a fiduciary are not allowed (note

80. See Ellis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 203-245 (2013) (referring to § 4975 S. Rept.
No. 93-383 (1974), 1973-3 C.B. (Supp.) 90; H.R. Rept. No. 93-807 (1974), 197403 C.B.
(Supp.) 236). The fact that the transaction is a prudent one is irrelevant.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A) (2020). A common prohibited transaction involves
the sale of property by the disqualified person to the plan followed by a lease-back
of the property by the plan to the disqualified person. Note: An ordinary bling purchase or sale of property where neither the buyer or seller nor agent of either knows
the identity of the other will not constitute a prohibited transaction.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (2020).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) (2020).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D) (2020).
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no reference to a party-in-interest being on the side of the transaction):
•
•

•

Dealing with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account (referred to as the selfdealing prohibition);85
Acting in the fiduciary’s individual or in any other
capacity in a transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party whose interests are averse to the interests of the plan or its participants or beneficiaries
(e.g., conflict of interest situations);86 or
Receiving any consideration for the fiduciary’s
own personal account from any party dealing with
such plan in connection with a transaction involving plan assets (referred to as the kickback prohibition).87

This second set of prohibited transaction rules will be referred
to in this article as the “fiduciary prohibited transactions” as they are
benefiting the fiduciary and do not necessarily involve a party-ininterest unless he or she is a fiduciary. Courts have long recognized
that the above prohibited transactions are not mutually exclusive,
and thus, a transaction could be prohibited for multiple reasons.88

85. 29 U.S.C. §1106(b)(1) (2020). ERISA’s section 406 reads: “406(a) Except as provided in section 408: (1) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to
engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes
a direct or indirect—(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, … (B) lending of money or other
extension of credit … (C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities … (D) transfer to,
or use by or for the benefit to … or (E) acquisition, on behalf of the plan, of any employer security or employer real property . . .:). In contrast, the Code’s section
4975(c)(1) General rule – For purposes of this section, the term ‘prohibited transaction’ means any direct or indirect—(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, … (B) lending of
money or other extension of credit … (C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities
… (D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit to … or (E) acts by a disqualified person
who is a fiduciary whereby he deals with the income or assets of a plan in his own
interest or for his own account; or (F) receipt of any consideration for his own personal account by any disqualified person who is a fiduciary from any party dealing
with the plan in connection with a transaction involving the income or assets of the
plan”), and I.R.C. section (d) reads “Except as provided in subsection (f)(6), the prohibitions provided in subsection (C) shall not apply to . . .”).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2) (2020).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3) (2020).
88. See Ellis v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. 468 (2013) (citing Janpol c. Comm’r, 101
T.C.M. 518, 25 (1993)).
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Code’s Rules
In contrast, Code § 4975(c) sets forth a single set of prohibited
transaction rules (that presumably are all exempt under the provisions of Code § 4975(d)), whether direct or indirect:
•
•
•
•
•

•

A sale or exchange, leasing, of any property between a plan and a disqualified person;89
Lending of money or other extension of credit between a plan and a disqualified person;90
Furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between
a plan and a disqualified person;91
Transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified person of the income or assets of a plan;92
An act by a disqualified person who is a fiduciary
whereby he deals with the income or assets of the
plan in his or her own interest or for his or her own
account;93 or
The receipt of any consideration by a disqualified
person who is a fiduciary for his or her own personal account from any party dealing with the plan
in connection with a transaction involving the income or assets of the plan.94

In comparing ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules with the
Code’s prohibited transaction rules, two statutory differences appear:
•

The Code’s fiduciary prohibited transactions do
not include ERISA’s second fiduciary prohibited
transaction rule involving conflicts of interest,
which makes sense as the Code does not impose a
fiduciary standard of acting in the best interest of
the plan participant or beneficiaries. The legislative
history indicates that the second fiduciary

89. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(c)(a)(A) (2020). The prohibited transaction rules include a
sale of property subject to a mortgage or lien, where the plan assumes the mortgage
otherwise owed by the disqualified person.
90. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B) (2020).
91. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(c)(1)(C) (2020).
92. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) (2020).
93. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E) (2020).
94. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(c)(1)(F) (2020).
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prohibited transaction was excluded from the Code
due to the difficulty in ascertaining the “appropriate measure” for an excise tax.95 The IRS, however,
in guidance, has read into the transactions prohibited under I.R.C. §§ 4975(c)(1)(E) and (F) to include
a fiduciary’s conflict of interest involving the income or assets of the plan.96
According to the terms of the statute, the Code’s fiduciary prohibited transactions are not written to
exclude the application of its statutory exemptions
set forth in I.R.C. § 4975(d), whereas ERISA’s prohibited transactions are. However, the IRS in its
regulations takes the position that the statutory exemptions do not contain an exemption for acts described in I.R.C. §§ 4975(c)(1)(E) or (F), as the latter
involves separate transactions that are not described in the statutory exemptions.97 The DOL also
takes a similar position that ERISA’s fiduciary prohibited transactions are not exempt under any of
the statutory exemptions.98 As will be discussed under the statutory exemption for reasonable compensation for services rendered, the majority of
courts affirm the DOL’s interpretation, but the

95. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, 4576 (1974) (Conf. Rep), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038 (stating “[T]he labor provisions (but not the tax provisions) prohibit a fiduciary
from acting in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a person (or representing a party) whose interests are adverse to the interest of the plan or of its participants
or beneficiaries. This prevents a fiduciary from being put in a position where he has
dual loyalties, and, therefore, he cannot act exclusively for the benefit of a plan’s participants and beneficiaries. (This prohibition is not included in the tax provisions,
because of the difficulty in determining an appropriate measure for an excise tax.”).
96. Treas. Reg. § 4.4975-6(a)(5)(i) (2020) (“The prohibitions of sections
4975(c)(1)(E) and (F) supplement the other provisions … by imposing on disqualified
persons who are fiduciaries a duty of undivided loyalty to the plans for which they
act. These prohibitions are imposed upon fiduciaries to deter them from exercising
the authority, control, or responsibility which makes such persons fiduciaries when
they have interests which may conflict with the interests of the plans for which they
act”).
97. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a) (2020) (stating that the statutory exemption for office space or services and certain transactions involving financial institutions does
not contain an exemption for acts described in section 4975(c)(1)(E) or (F) as such acts
are separate transactions not described in the statutory exemption).
98. Fiduciary Responsibility Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(a) (1998) (stating that section 408(b)(2) “exempts
from the prohibitions of section 406(a) of the Act . . .” but “does not contain an exemption from acts described in section 406(b)(1) . . ., section 406(b)(2) or section
406(b)(3)”).

26

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22.1

Eighth Circuit rejects it, stating it “conflicts with an
unambiguous statute.”99

Indirect Prohibited Transactions
Under plan assets rules that will be discussed later in the article,
the DOL takes a counterintuitive approach such that there are circumstances whereby, if the plan invested in certain entities, the underlying assets of that entity are also deemed to be plan assets.100 If
the plan asset rules were applicable, they could expand the transactions involving plan assets that are prohibited. In the aftermath of the
issuance of these plan asset rules, the DOL sought to expand transactions that would otherwise have been prohibited by capturing indirect transactions, seeking to accomplish the same result.101 For example, even if an entity did not hold plan assets, if such investment
in the entity was made by the plan with the expectation or understanding that the entity would engage in a transaction that otherwise
would have been prohibited if done directly, such investment would
also be prohibited. The DOL Advisory Opinion 2006-01A is illustrative of this rule.102 Under the facts of that opinion, taxpayer Berry
proposed having an LLC be created to buy and lease property to the
S Company, which was a disqualified person relative to Berry’s IRA.
Due to one of the exceptions under the DOL’s plan asset rules, the
underlying property of the LLC would not be a plan asset of Berry’s
IRA. However, if there was an understanding that the IRA would
invest in the LLC who in turn would engage in a lease transaction
with a disqualified person, that amounted to an indirect prohibited
transaction under I.R.C. §§ 4975(c)(1)(A) and (D), and thus not be allowed.
Other examples of indirect prohibited transactions involve transactions between the plan and an entity that was not a disqualified
person (e.g., an entity that was owned less than 50% by a disqualified
person), but indirectly benefitted a disqualified person. In the case of
Rollins v. Comm’r, a plan fiduciary lent plan monies to three entities
who were not disqualified persons as the plan fiduciary had only a

99. Harley v. 3m, 284 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2002).
100. DOL Interpretive Bulletin 7502, 51 Fed. Red. 41290 (Dep’t of Labor Nov. 13,
1986).
101. Fiduciary Responsibility Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2 (1998).
102. DOL Adv. Op. 2006-01A (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 6, 2006).
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minority interests in each of the entities.103 While not held a violation
of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B) (i.e., direct or indirect lending of money), the
court held that the plan loans indirectly benefitted the plan fiduciary,
even though none of the plan assets were transferred to him, in violation of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) (i.e., use of the plan assets for the disqualified person’s benefit).104
As the fiduciary prohibited transaction rules cover direct and
indirect transactions involving the plan’s fiduciary, included in the
notion of “indirect benefit” to a fiduciary would include a benefit to
someone in whom that fiduciary has an interest, such that it affected
his fiduciary judgement. For example, the fiduciary’s retention of his
son to provide administrative services to the IRA for a fee would result in an indirect benefit to the fiduciary, which involves IRA assets.105
Examples of Prohibited Transactions
From the DOL’s advisory opinions, the IRS’ guidance, and
caselaw, we have a variety of examples of what constitutes a prohibited transaction, for which there is no known statutory exemption.
These include:
Sales, Exchanges or Leases: Prohibited transactions that are
sales, exchanges, or leases under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A)
and/or I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A) include:
•

In the case of Morrissey v. Comm’r,106 the Court examined the facts in which a sole owner of a business
established a money purchase plan from which he
took a number of loans from the plan, secured and
unsecured by his plan’s account balance. When the
owner repaid the plan loans by transferring real estate to the plan, the transfer of real estate in repayment of the owner’s debt to the plan was held to be
a “sale or exchange” prohibited under I.R.C. §

103. Rollins v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2004-260 (Nov. 15, 2004).
104. See also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9119002, 1991 WL 778551; DOL Adv. Op. 9333A (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 16, 1993).
105. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a)(6), Example (6) (2020).
106. Morrissey v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 1006 (1998). See I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 9713002 for a similar fact pattern where the sole owner of the corporation is
lent monies from the two retirement plans, evidence by promissory notes with a
stated rate of interest but no fixed term or collateral, and repays those debts by transferring real estate to the plan.
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4975(c)(1)(A).107 As this was a qualified plan, the
consequence was the application of the excise tax in
I.R.C. § 4975(a), (b).108
In the case of McDougall v. Donovan,109 the Court
held the purchase of a jet by the plan trustees from
an aircraft firm was an indirect sale prohibited by
ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A), as the firm had just acquired
the jet from the union conference whose members
were
participants
under
the
plan.

Lending of money or other extensions of credit: Prohibited
transactions that involve the lending of money or other
extensions of credit under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(B) and/or
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A) include:
•

In the case of Zacky v. Comm’r, the Tax Court reviewed facts whereby the taxpayer was the president and sole owner of Aspects Inc., which maintained a qualified profit-sharing plan, under which
the taxpayer was the plan’s sole trustee.110 The taxpayer borrowed funds (Loan #1) from the plan to
pay Aspects Inc.’s payroll.111 Shortly thereafter, the
plan lent funds (Loan #2) to a related corporation,
Inland Empire Properties, Inc. (Inland), which was
fully owned by the taxpayer, in order for the taxpayer to pay an outstanding car loan.112 As a result
of Loan #2, the taxpayer transferred the car’s title

107. Id. at 6.
108. Id. at 7.
109. McDougall v. Donovan, 552 F. Supp 1206 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
110. Zacky v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1378 (2004). See also D.E.W. Plumbing v.
Domestic Mortgage, No. 1:20-CV-2593-TWT, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92136 (N.D. GA. July
3, 2012) (finding a prohibited transaction when the fiduciary to the plan signed a
promissory note of $45,000 between the plan as lender, and Domestic Mortgage, as
borrower, where the borrower was 100% owned by the fiduciary and his children);
In re Daniels, 452 B.R. 335 (Bankr. D. Mass. Ct. 2011) (holding the debtor who established a profit sharing plan in which he was the sole participant, plan trustee, plan
administrator, and employer engaged in a prohibited transaction by allowing the
plan to make a loan to the debtor’s son); Janpol v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 518, 525-27 (1993)
(finding that 50% shareholders of AJVW and participants under the AJVW profit
sharing engaged in prohibited transactions by lending monies to the plan as the
shareholders and AJVW were disqualified persons with respect to the trust).
111. Supra, note 87.
112. Id.
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114.
115.
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117.
118.
119.

to Inland.113 Subsequent to Loan #2, the plan made
another loan to Inland (Loan #3) to allow Inland to
pay mortgage and real estate taxes due on a building that it owned.114 Finding that each loan was either a direct or indirect act by a disqualified person
who is a fiduciary (i.e., the taxpayer) with the plan,
it was not only prohibited under I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(B) as a direct or indirect lending of
money, it was also a direct or indirect transfer to, or
use by or for the benefit, of a disqualified person of
the income or assets of a plan, prohibited under
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) and a direct or indirect act by
a disqualified person who is a fiduciary dealing
with the income or assets of the plan for his own
interest or for his own account, prohibited under
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E).115
In DOL Adv. Op. 2011-04A,116 the DOL opined on
a proposal by an IRA owner to have his IRA purchase a note and deed of trust from a bank, that had
provided a personal loan to the IRA owner and his
spouse to purchase real estate. If acceptable, the
IRA would be the holder of the note and the IRA
owner and his spouse would make payments on
the note directly to the IRA.117 It was the DOL’s
opinion that such transaction would be a prohibited extension of credit, in violation of I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(B), between the IRA and disqualified
persons (i.e., the IRA owner and spouse).118 It also
noted that the continued holding of the note by the
IRA would be a continuing prohibited transaction
under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B) as long as payments on
the note were made by the IRA owner and his
spouse.119 As to whether the proposed transaction
was part of an arrangement to otherwise benefit the
IRA fiduciary such that it affects his best judgment
as a fiduciary, the DOL declined to opine as such
determination is an inherently factual question. If

Id.
Id. at 2
Id. at 7-9.
DOL Adv. Op. 2011-04A (Dep’t of Labor, Feb. 3, 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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so, that would give rise to an additional prohibited
transaction.120
Furnishing of goods, services, or facilities: Prohibited
transactions that involve the furnishing of goods,
services, or facilities under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(c) and/or
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(C) include:
•

•

In PLR 8245075, the IRS held that a prohibited
transaction under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(C) would exist
if the corporate trustee for an IRA were to use corporate funds to buy life insurance on behalf of the
individuals who established IRAs with it.121 While
there was no direct transaction between the plan
(i.e., the IRA) and a disqualified person (i.e., the
trustee), the IRA owner participating in the program would indirectly benefit in a prohibited transaction under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(C).
In the case of Marshall v. Snyder, the plan trustees
for the three employee benefit plans of General
Teamsters Industrial Employees Local 806 were
paid monies from the employer and the plan for
services rendered to the employer and to Local
806.122 The court held such payments to be prohibited transactions under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C), and
not exempt under one of the statutory exemptions
of ERISA § 408(b) by reason of the provisions of
ERISA
§
406(b)(2).123

Transferring of assets: Prohibited transactions involve the
transfer to, or use by, under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(D)
and/or I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) include:
•

120.
121.
122.
123.

In the case of Harris v. Comm’r, the IRA purchased
property that used as the personal residence of the
IRA owner. In a brief decision, the Tax Court held
that the IRA owner engaged in a prohibited transaction under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) as a disqualified

Id.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8245075 (Aug. 16, 1982).
Marshall v. Snyder, 572 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 900-903.
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person (i.e., the IRA owner) used plan assets for his
own benefit.124 A similar result would occur if the
residence was used by a family member.
In the case of Reich v. Compton, prior to ERISA, the
plan lent monies to the Electrical Mechanic Association (EMA), an alter ego for Local 98 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers whose
members were covered under the plan.125 In light of
the passage of ERISA, the plan accepted payment
from EMA of $380,289.93 in full satisfaction of the
debt, which at the time had an accounting value of
$653,817.47. The Secretary of Labor filed suit alleging the transaction constituted an indirect transaction with Local 98 (an alter ego of a party in interest) in violation of ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A), (B), and
(D).126 The court remanded the case to the district
court for a finding as to whether there is proof of a
subject intent to benefit a party in interest, as it is
an element required under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(D) in
order to support the statutory phrase “for the benefit.”127
In a Technical Advice Memorandum 9208001, the
IRS reviewed the facts of a case in which a solely
owned firm sponsored a qualified defined benefit
plan which invested $250,000 in a mortgage loan to
a limited partnership in which the owner had a
7.5% interest.128 Finding the owner to be a fiduciary
due to his authority or control over the plan investments, the IRS held that the transaction benefitted
the owner (i.e., a disqualified person), due to his
ownership interest in the limited partnership, and
thus
violated
I.R.C.
§
4975(c)(1)(D).

Fiduciary Prohibited Transactions: Transactions that
involve fiduciary prohibited transactions under ERISA
§§ 406(b)(1)-(3) and/or I.R.C. § 4975(d)(1)(E) or (F)

124. Harris v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 1983 (1994) (citing the legislative history
in H. Conf. Rept. 93-1280 (1974), 1974-3 C.B. 415, 501, for the proposition that the IRA
owner was a disqualified person).
125. Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 1995).
126. Id. at 274.
127. Id. at 281.
128. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem 9208001 (Oct. 4, 1991).
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include:
•

•

•

Generally, both the IRS and the DOL are reluctant
to opine on transactions that involve fiduciary prohibited transactions as they perceive such situations to be inherently factual in nature, making a
ruling more problematic.129
In the case of Cutaiar v. Marshall, the court found
that “when the trustees of two employee benefit
plans whose participants and beneficiaries are not
identical effect a loan between plans without an §
408 exemption, a per se violation of ERISA occurs.”130 Hence, it held that fiduciaries acting on
both sides of a loan transaction could not negotiate
for the best interest of either plan and thus violated
ERISA § 406(b)(2).
In the case of Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., the plan
and its trustees brought suit against the plans’ investment manager and its affiliates, as well as the
owners of the plan’s investment manager and its affiliates (“defendants”), on the claim that the defendants’ investment of the plan assets in equities
in which the individual defendants were part-owners constituted prohibited self-dealing under
ERISA § 406(b).131 The three individuals owned
50%, 25% and 25%, respectively, of three corporations, Tower Asset Management, Inc., (“Tower Asset”) (who was the investment manager to the
plans), Tower Capital Corporation (who was an investment banking corporation), and Tower Securities (who was a registered broker-dealer).132 Tower
Asset received a fee of one-half of one percent of the
market value of the plans (i.e., approximately $30
million) for investing the plans’ assets in companies
in which the three individuals owned a substantial
equity interest.133 The other two Tower entities entered into contract with entities to raise capital in
exchange for compensation, which Tower Asset

129. ERISA Op. Ltr., 89-03A (Dep’t of Labor Mar. 23, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8717079 (Feb. 2, 1987).
130. Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 1970).
131. Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., 829 F.2d 1209, 1209, 1218, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987).
132. Id. at 1212.
133. Id.

2020]

THE PERILS OF SELF-DIRECTED IRAs

33

then invested plan assets into those companies.134
Such investment of plan assets usually occurred
subsequent to the individual defendants’ acquisition of such companies. The district court held that
Tower Asset and its two affiliates were fiduciaries
to the plan, and due to the “close and intimate relationship between the corporate and individual defendants,” the corporate veil was pierced, holding
them all liable.135 The Second Circuit affirmed the
district court’s finding that Tower Asset’s investment of plan assets in companies in which the individuals owned a substantial equity interest to be a
violation of ERISA § 406(b)(1).136 The Second Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that
the payment of fees was “in connection with” the
investment of the plan’s assets in violation of
ERISA § 406(b)(3).137 While ERISA § 408(c)(2) provides an exemption for fiduciaries receiving reasonable compensation for services rendered to the
plan, the court held that it did not exempt the fees
and compensation that the defendants received
from companies in which the plans’ assets were invested.138

Statutory Exemptions from the Prohibited Transaction Rules
Both ERISA and the Code contain statutory exemptions from
the prohibited transaction rules. ERISA’s statutory exemptions set
forth in ERISA § 408(b) were not carefully drafted. The prohibited
transaction rules set forth in ERISA § 406 state that the prohibited
transaction rules of ERISA set forth in ERISA § 406(a) have an exception in ERISA § 408 (due to the language “[e]xcept as provided in
section 408” which appears at the beginning of § 406(a)), whereas the
fiduciary prohibited transaction rules set forth in ERISA § 406(b) do
not have a similar exception clause—which appears to set up the presumption that rules of ERISA § 406(a) permit the use of statutory exemptions, but the rules of ERISA § 406(b) do not.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1214.
Id.
Id. at 1216.
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ERISA § 406(a) reads as follows (emphasis added):
ERISA § 406(a) Transactions Between Plan and Party In Interest. – Except as provided in section 408: (1) A fiduciary
with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in
a transaction, if he knows or should have known that such
transaction constitutes a direct or indirect – (A) sale or exchange, or leasing, …. (B) lending or money or other extension of credit … (C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities … (D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of …
ERISA § 406(b) reads as follows:
ERISA § 406(b) Transactions Between Plan and Fiduciary –
A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not – (1) deal with
the assets of the plan for his own interest or for his own
account, (2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in
any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party (or
represent a party) whose interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries, or (3) receive any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing with such plan in
connection with a transaction involving the assets of the
plan.
However, the statutory language of the statutory exemptions set
forth in ERISA § 408 does not make this interpretation explicit as it
does not refer solely to ERISA § 406(a).
ERISA § 408(b) reads as follows:
ERISA § 408(b) Enumeration of Transactions Exempted
From Section 406 Prohibitions. – The prohibitions provided
in section 406 shall not apply to any of the following transactions …
In reviewing the language of ERISA § 408:
•

ERISA § 408(a) sets forth the exemption procedure
for the DOL to use to grants administrative exemptions to the prohibited transaction rules and
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contemplates that the DOL could grant exemptions
for both the prohibited transaction rules of ERISA §
406(a), as well as for the fiduciary prohibited transaction rules of ERISA § 406(b).
ERISA § 408(b) sets forth the statutory exemptions
but states that “[t]he prohibitions provided in section 406 shall not apply to any of the following
transactions”—not explicitly stating whether they
apply to ERISA § 406(a) and/or ERISA § 406(b) prohibited transaction rules. The language should
have been tighter – to mimic the language in ERISA
§ 406(a)—if such statutory exemptions were to apply only to the ERISA § 406(a) prohibited transaction rules, which is the DOL’s interpretation of the
statute.139
ERISA § 408(c) acts as a modification to ERISA § 406
– again not limited to ERISA § 406(a), and thus, presumably could apply to ERISA § 406(b) transactions, such that (1) a party-in-interest person or fiduciary may receive a benefit to which he is
otherwise entitled to as a participant or beneficiary
(provided it is computed and paid on a basis consistent with the terms of the plan as applied to all
other participants and beneficiaries); (2) a disqualified person or fiduciary may receive reasonable
compensation for services rendered, or reimbursement of expenses properly incurred in connection
with the performance of duties with the plan (provided a person otherwise receiving full-time pay
from an employer or employee organization does
not receive compensation from the plan other than
for reimbursement of expense properly incurred);
and (3) a person may serve as a fiduciary in addition to being an officer, employee, agent, or other
representative of a party in interest.

In contrast, the Code’s statutory exemptions in I.R.C. § 4975(d)
are clearer – I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1) sets forth a single set of prohibited
transaction rules, which include the fiduciary prohibited transaction
rules (with the exception of the conflict of interest situation) and
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(2) grants the Secretary the ability to establish an exemption procedure, not differentiating between exemptions for the

139. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(a) (2019).
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first four prohibited transactions as opposed to exemptions from the
fiduciary prohibited transactions (other than requiring a hearing and
determination of certain findings, applicable to the latter ones, but
not the former ones). The statutory exemptions in I.R.C. § 4975(d)
state that the prohibitions contained in I.R.C. § 4975(c) do not apply
– not differentiating between the first four prohibited transactions
and the latter two, which are fiduciary prohibited transactions. Yet
the IRS’ regulatory interpretation is that the statutory exemptions do
not apply to the fiduciary prohibited transactions set forth in I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(E) and (F).140 While the IRS’ interpretation is not supported
by the literal reading of the statute, practitioners should be aware
that taking a position that is contrary to published regulation must
be disclosed on the tax return; otherwise the taxpayer could be faced
with an accuracy related understatement penalty.141
A reading of I.R.C. § 4975(d) is further complicated as it is caveated with the phrase “[E]xcept as provided in subsection (f)(6))”.
I.R.C. § 4975(f)(6) states that the statutory exemptions in I.R.C.
§4975(d) (with the exception of exemptions contained in I.R.C. §
4975(d)(9) and (12)) do not apply to certain transactions involving a
“trust described in section 401(a) which is part of a plan providing
contributions or benefits for employees some or all of whom are
owner-employees.” The statute then defines owner-employees to include “[a] participant or beneficiary of an individual retirement plan
(as defined in section 7701(a)(37)),” which in return refers to an IRA
described in I.R.C. § 408(a) or individual retirement annuity described in I.R.C. § 408(b). While the reference to I.R.C. § 408(a) and
(c) seems to be misplaced as the typical IRA is not subject to a trust
described in I.R.C. § 401(a), the statute may be referring to non-typical IRAs in which the employer is sponsoring a payroll-deduction
IRA through a plan which is funded by a trust. For example, an IRA
established pursuant to I.R.C. § 408(c), entitled “Accounts established by employers and certain association of employees” and I.R.C
§ 408(k) (established Simplified Employee Pensions) could fit such a
description as trusts that are created by the employer for the exclusive benefit of its employees or their beneficiaries (which is not the
typical IRA situation). But the reference to IRAs in I.R.C. § 4975(f)(6)
would appear not to be relevant in the typical IRA context as an IRA
is not a qualified plan, with a trust described in § 401(a).

140. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a)(1).
141. I.R.C. § 6662 (2020) imposing a 20% accuracy-related penalty for underpayments in the context where the underpayment was made due to disregard and nondisclosure of the regulations.
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The IRS 2010 Training Manual simply repeats the statute, not
shedding much light on whether the typical IRA would be subject to
I.R.C. § 4975(f)(6), and thus the statutory exemptions (other than
I.R.C. § 4975(d)(9), (d)(12)) would not be applicable.142 But a brief
2009 Chief Counsel Opinion appears to contradict the view that IRAs
could not be subject to the statutory exemptions, indicating that the
I.R.C. § 4075(d)(10) exemption for reasonable compensation is applicable to IRAs (thus, indicating I.R.C § 4975(f)(6) did not apply). However, the exemption for reasonable compensation did not apply in
the context of payment of salary to an IRA owner (presumably for
his work performed in an IRA owned LLC) as there was an inherent
conflict of interest with the IRA owner being in a position to determine the amount of compensation.143 Hence, the Service concluded
that the payment of compensation of salary to an IRA owner would
be an act described in I.R.C. § 4075(c)(1)(E) or (F) due to the conflict
of interest inherent in the situation, referencing the Treas. Reg. §
54.4975-6(a). Interestingly, the IRS 2017 Training Manual is silent on
the issue, suggesting the IRS may be rethinking its approach.144
ERISA § 408(b) sets forth 20 statutory exemptions, as well as the
grant of authority to the DOL to issue class and individual administrative exemptions.145 In contrast, the Code sets forth 23 statutory exemptions under its prohibited transaction rules, set forth in IRC §
4975(d). As noted earlier, the IRS’ view is that the Code’s fiduciary
prohibited transactions are not exempt under any of the statutory exemptions, and thus, if they are to be permitted, would have to be set
forth in a DOL class or individual administrative exemptions.
Relevant statutory and class exemptions
In the context of self-directed IRAs, the relevant statutory and
class exemptions are as follows:
Loans or other extension of credits between the IRA and a

142. IRS Prohibited Transaction, Section 11, 4.72.11.2 (last revised Nov. 1, 2010).
The current IRS Training Manual in Section 4.72.11.3 simply states “The statutory
exemptions under IRC § 4975(d) (other than IRC § 4975(d)(9) and (12)) don’t apply to
certain types of transactions involving owner-employees (as defined in IRC §
401(c)(3)) and persons or entities deemed to be owner-employees. See I.R.C. §
4975(f)(6) (2018).”
143. Re: Salary as PT, CCA 2009112409523350 (Dec. 24, 2009)
144. IRS Prohibited Transactions, 4.72.11.3 (Sep. 21, 2017).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a)-(b) (2020).
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disqualified person: PTE 80-26
Normally, both ERISA and the Code’s prohibited transaction
rules prohibit the lending of money or other extension of credit between an IRA and a disqualified person involving IRA assets. This
would also include the use of an IRA assets for the benefit of the IRA
owner.146 Under the class exemption PTE 80-26, certain loans and
other extension of credits are permitted for (1) the payment of “ordinary operating expenses of the plan” or (2) payment of other expenses “incidental to the ordinary operation of the plan.”147 Two
DOL advisory opinions add insight as to the meaning of this exemption.
In DOL Adv. Op. 2009-03A, Mr. Berry requested an advisory
opinion as to whether a prohibited transaction would occur if an IRA
owner granted to a brokerage firm a security interest in the assets of
his non-IRA accounts (known as cross-collateral arrangements) held
by the broker to cover indebtedness that the self-directed IRA may
incur. The DOL concluded that such grant of a security interest in his
non-IRA accounts to cover indebtedness of his IRA would constitute
a prohibited transaction under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B) (i.e., lending or
other extension of credit), quoting from ERISA’s legislative history.148
This is an extension of credit by the IRA to the IRA owner (a fiduciary, as the account is self-directed) and the broker (a disqualified person, as either custodian or trustee). But it also noted that the situation
described would likely result in other prohibited transaction violations of the prohibited transactions as the IRA owner would be transferring or using the IRA’s assets for his own benefit in violation of
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) and using the IRA assets “in his own interest or
for his own account” in violation of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E).
In DOL Adv. Op. 2011-09A, the same Mr. Berry requested an
advisory opinion in connection with an IRA owner directing a trust
company to open a futures trading account for purposes of self-directing the investment of such account.149 With the establishment of
146. 29 U.S.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B) (2018); 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B), (D) (2018).
147. PTE 80-26, 45 Fed. Reg. 28545 (April 29, 1980), as corrected by 45 Fed. Reg.
35040 (May 23, 1980), as amended in 65 Fed. Reg. 17540 (April 3, 2000), 67 Fed. Reg.
9483 (Mar. 1, 2002), 67 Fed. Reg. 9485 (Mar. 1, 2002) and 71 Fed. Reg. 17917 (April 7,
2006).
148. DOL Adv. Op. 2009-03A (Oct. 27, 2009) (quoting from ERISA’s Conference
Report that “… a prohibited transaction generally will occur if a loan to a plan is
guaranteed by a party-in-interest [disqualified person], unless it comes within the
special exemption for employee stock ownership plans,” H.R. Rep. No. 1280, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 308 (1974)).
149. DOL Adv. Op. 2011-09A (Oct. 20, 2011).
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such account, the broker wanted an indemnification agreement effectuated by the IRA owner to secure the broker against losses or
taxes attributable to the IRA account that would exceed the amount
of assets held in the IRA (referred to as excess loss). While such indemnification agreement would otherwise be an impermissible extension of credit by the IRA owner to his IRA, the request inquired
whether the class exemption PTE 80-26 provided relief from the prohibited transaction rules. Under that exemption, the proceeds of
loans or extensions of credit to such plan are possible only if (1) they
are used for the payment of ordinary operating expenses of the plan
(e.g., payment of benefits, premiums under an insurance or annuity
contract, or administrative expenses) or (2) they are used for a purpose “incidental to the ordinary operation of the plan.”150 Such a class
exemption permits loans to be made interest-free to the plan for purposes of ordinary operating expenses. In the advisory opinion, the
DOL stated that losses that arise in connection with the investment
performance of a futures contract entered into by an IRA is not an
“ordinary operating expense” for purpose of PTE 80-26, nor are they
“incidental” costs associated with the ordinary operation of the plan.
These two advisory opinions caused confusion within the financial community as plan sponsors, the self-employed, and IRA owners routinely indemnify their plans so as to engage in short sales,
margin transaction, and options and future trading – all which involve the use of cross-collateralization agreements. To the extent
such agreements are prohibited, service providers’ fees need to be
increased due to the additional risk that must be borne. The IRS issued Announcement 2011-81 granting temporary relief to IRS owners who sign certain indemnification agreements “[p]ending further
action by the [Department] and until issuance of further guidance
form the IRS superseding [the Announcement].”151 The DOL responded with a proposed amendment to PTE 80-26, giving retroactive (from January 1975) and temporary relief, and requesting comments.152 The Securities Industry and Financial Market Association
(“SIFMA”) responded with comments that the DOL amend PTE 8026 to permit indemnification agreements and cross-collateralization
clauses used in brokerage agreements with self-directed IRAs.153 It

150. PTE 80-26, 45 Fed. Reg. 28545, as corrected 45 Fed. Reg. 35040.
151. IRS Ann. 2011-81, I.R.B. 2011-52 (Dec. 27, 2011).
152. DOL request for a proposed amendment to PTE 80-26, 78 Fed. Reg. 31584
(May 24, 2013).
153. Letter from SIFMA to the U.S. Department of Labor, available at
https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/sifma-submits-commentsto-the-ebsa-on-pte-80-26-for-certain-interest-free-loans-to-employee-benefit-
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requested retroactive relief and a permanent prospective exemptions. The financial community continues to await guidance from the
agencies.
Service Providers: Exemptions under ERISA §§ 408(b)(2), (c)(2),
and I.R.C. § 4975(d)(2), (d)(10):
These statutory exemptions become relevant in the context of an
IRA paying compensation to the IRA owner or other disqualified
person for services rendered to the IRA. This is particularly relevant
in the self-directed IRA context, where the IRA owner forms a business (usually an LLC) and acts as the LLC’s general manager and
wishes to be paid for his services as general manager. Some observers point to the second of these statutory exemptions – ERISA § 408(c)
and I.R.C. § 4975(d)(10) – to permit the fiduciary prohibited transaction, whereby a disqualified person (including a fiduciary) can receive reasonable compensation for services rendered to the plan.
As a service provider is by definition a disqualified person (and
party in interest), both ERISA and the Code provide a statutory exemption under ERISA § 408(b)(2) and I.R.C. § 4975(d)(2), such that
the plan can enter into a contract with a service provider for office
space, or legal, accounting, or other services necessary for the establishment or operation of the plan and pay reasonable compensation
for such services.154 In the context of transactions involving fiduciaries who are service providers, the IRS regulations again take the position that furnishing of office space or a service by a fiduciary regarding acts that involve conflicts of interest under I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(E) or (F) are regarded as separate transactions which are
not exempt under the statutory exemption.155 In its regulations, the
IRS admonishes the disqualified person who is a fiduciary of their
duty of undivided loyalty to the plan and to deter from “exercising
the authority, control, or responsibility which makes such persons
fiduciaries when they have interests which may conflict with the interests of the plans for which they act.”156 As such, the fiduciary may
not cause the plan to pay additional fees to such fiduciary, or to a

plans.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
154. I.R.C. § 4975(d)(2) read as follows: “any contract, or reasonable arrangement,
made with a disqualified person for office space, or legal, accounting, or other services necessary for the establishment or operation of the plan, if no more than reasonable compensation is paid therefor,” with ERISA § 408(b)(2) reading comparable,
but using the term “party in interest” in lieu of “disqualified person.”
155. 29 C.F.R § 2550.408b-2(a) (2020).
156. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a)(5)(i).
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person in which the fiduciary has an interest which could affect his
best judgment as a fiduciary.157 Nor can a fiduciary use his authority,
control, or responsibility to cause the plan to enter into a transaction
involving plan assets in which the fiduciary, or a person in which the
fiduciary has an interest, will receive consideration from a third
party in connection with the transaction.158 The DOL takes a comparable position that the statutory exemption of ERISA § 408(b)(2) does
not extend to fiduciary prohibited transactions, involving self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and kickbacks.159 In its advisory opinions,
the DOL states that situations in which the plan fiduciary increases its
own compensation by means of its recommendations to use certain
investment products offered by it or its affiliates results in self-dealing.160
There is another exception in both ERISA § 408(c) and I.R.C. §
4975(d)(10) for the payment of reasonable compensation for fiduciaries, but they are structured and worded differently. Some practitioners point to these exceptions as permitting the payment of compensation to an IRA owner (i.e., a fiduciary) who renders services for
the IRA or for a business owned by the IRA. However, one practitioner, Richard Matta, has questioned whether the DOL spent so
much time working on its mammoth fiduciary proposal and corresponding “Best Interest Contract” (BIC) Exemption, if these exceptions provided such relief.161 Under the Code, there is a second statutory exemption found in I.R.C. § 4975(d)(10) which permits receipt
by a disqualified person reasonable compensation for services rendered (or reimbursement of expenses incurred) in the performance
of his duties with the plan.162 Since this second statutory exemption
appears to duplicate I.R.C. § 4975(d)(2), the IRS in its regulations take

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 26 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(a) (2018) (stating similar language in the IRS regulations that such fiduciary prohibited transactions are separate transactions not described in ERISA § 408(b)(2)).
160. DOL Adv. Op. 97-15A (May 22, 1977) and DOL Adv. Op. 2005-10A (May 11,
2005). But see in DOL Adv. Op. 97-15A (referred to as the “Frost Bank” opinion), the
fiduciary could avoid engaging in self -dealing if it offset the additional compensation against fees the plan otherwise owes the plan fiduciary. See DOL Adv. Op. 9715A.
161. See Richard K. Matta, Who Cares About the BIC Exemption for IRAs – “Reasonable Compensation” is Already Exempt … Isn’t It?, (Sept. 2015), https://benefitslink.com
/articles/Groom_4975_BICE.pdf.
162. I.R.C. § 4975(d)(10), with the caveat that in the context of a person already
receiving full-time pay from an employer, association of employers, or employee organization, compensation for services rendered to the plan will not be paid except
for reimbursement of expenses properly incurred.

42

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22.1

the position that it merely clarifies the first exemption, without
providing a separate, second exemption.163 In the context of paying a
plan fiduciary for services rendered to the plan, the regulations do
not prohibit such payment unless the fiduciary is already receiving
full-time pay from an employer, association of employers, or employee organization whose employees or members are covered under the plan.164
Similarly, under ERISA § 408(c)(2), it says that nothing in ERISA
§ 406 shall prohibit a fiduciary from receiving reasonable compensation for services rendered (or reimbursement of expenses property
incurred).165 If one reads ERISA § 408(c) in conjunction with ERISA §
406, one possible interpretation is that only the per se prohibited
transactions are covered under ERISA § 408 (including ERISA §
408(c)(2)), and that the fiduciary prohibited transactions of ERISA §
406(b) (which have no exception for ERISA § 408) are not exempt under ERISA § 408(c). Alternatively, one could read ERISA § 408(c) to
provide an exception for all of ERISA § 406 (including the fiduciary
prohibited transactions) as it is not written to say as “nothing in section 406(a).”
The language of ERISA § 408(c) is as follows:
ERISA § 408(c) Fiduciary Benefits and Compensation Not
Prohibited by Section 406 – Nothing in section 406 shall be
construed to prohibit any fiduciary from … (2) receiving
any reasonable compensation for services rendered …
The DOL have adopted in its regulations the first interpretation,
as was discussed above.166 As to the meaning of ERISA § 408(c)(2),
the DOL interprets it, similarly to the IRS’ interpretation of I.R.C. §

163. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(e) (“Section 4975(d)(2) refers to the payment of reasonable compensation by a plan to a disqualified person for services rendered to the
plan. Section 4975(d)(10) and §§ 54.4975-6(e)(2) through 54.4975-6(e)(5) clarify what
constitutes reasonable compensation for such services.”).
164. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(e)(3). The regulations also state that excess compensation as defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (relating to compensation for personal services which constitutes an ordinary and necessary trade or business expense) will not
be considered “reasonable compensation.”
165. 29 U.S. § 1108(c) (2018), with the same exception seen in I.R.C. § 4975(d)(10)
(2018), for persons already receiving full-time pay from an employer, association of
employers, or employee organization whose employees or members are participants
in the plan (except for reimbursement of expenses properly incurred).
166. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(a) (2020).
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4975(d)(10), to say it merely clarifies what is reasonable compensation for purposes of the first statutory exemption in ERISA §
408(b)(2).167 In the context of compensation of a fiduciary, the DOL
takes a similar position as the IRS, that reasonable compensation
does not include any compensation to a fiduciary who is already fulltime pay from an employer, association of employers, or employee
organization whose employees or members are participants in the
plan (except for the reimbursement of direct expenses property incurred and not otherwise reimbursed).168
The majority of courts affirm the DOL’s regulatory position that
ERISA § 408(c)(2) does not permit fiduciary prohibited transactions
by a plan fiduciary regarding plan assets.169 But the lone Eighth Circuit takes a contrary view. In the case of Harley v. Minn. Mining and
Mfg. Co., the court concludes that ERISA § 408(c) provides that nothing in ERISA § 406 shall be interpreted to prohibit any fiduciary from
receiving reasonable compensation for services rendered in the performance of his duties with the plan, including its self-dealing prohibitions.170 Under the facts of the case, 3M’s plan assets were invested in the Granite Corporation (“Granite”), a hedge fund that
invested in primarily collateralized mortgage obligations, under a
performance-based compensation agreement with Granite’s investment advisor, Askin Capital Management (“ACM”). A class of
167. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408c-2(a) (2020) (Section 408(b)(2) . . . refers to the payment
of reasonable compensation by a plan to a party in interest for services rendered to
the plan. Section 408(c)(2) of the Act and §§ 2550.408c-2(b)(1) through 2550.408c2(b)(4) clarify what constitutes reasonable compensation for such services).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408c-(b)(2) (2020).
169. See Nat’l Sec. Sys. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 65, 90-91 (3rd Cir. 2012) (agreeing with the
DOL that ERISA § 408(c)(2) does not provide fiduciaries with a defense from an
ERISA § 406(b)(3) whenever reasonable compensation was paid); Patelco Credit Union v. Sahni, 262 F.3d 897, 911 (9th Cir. 2001) (reviewing cases that discuss the interplay between ERISA §§ 408(c) and 406 and concluding that ERISA § 408(c) exemption
does not apply if self-dealing is involving in the transaction securing the payment);
LaScala v. Scrufari, 96 F. Supp. 2d 233, 238-39 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); Daniels v. Nat’l Employee Benefit Servs., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 684, 693 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Whitfield v. Tomasso, 682 F. Supp. 1287, 1304 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255,
1264 (D.N.J. 1980) (stating that the DOL regulations would steal §1108(c)(2) of its “independent exemptive power”); Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 353-54 (W.D.
Okla. 1978). But see Harley v. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co., 284 F.3d 901, 909 (8th Cir.
2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 872 (2003) (interpreting ERISA § 408(c)(2) to unambiguously and “sensibly insulated [] the fiduciary from liability [for a § 408(b) violation]
if … compensation [is] … reasonable”); Lowden v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d
1209, 1216 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Section 1108(c)(2) provides that [§ 1106] shall not be construed to prohibit any fiduciary from ‘receiving any reasonable compensation for services rendered …”).
170. Harley v. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co., 284 F.3d 901, 909 (8th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 872 (2003).
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participants and beneficiaries of 3M sued, alleging that the ACM’s
fee arrangement violated the prohibition against a fiduciary dealing
with plan assets for its own account under ERISA § 406(b)(1), as
ACM was a fiduciary.171 The plaintiffs relied on the DOL regulations
for the proposition that ERISA § 408(c)(2) did not apply to the fiduciary prohibited transactions under ERISA § 406(b), but merely clarifies the statutory exemption under ERISA § 408(b)(2).172 But the
court rejects this interpretation as “it conflicts with an unambiguous
statute.”173 Thus, ERISA § 408(c) permits a fiduciary to receive compensation as long as it is reasonable.174 As 3M had introduced uncontradicted expert testimony that the compensation paid to ACM was
reasonable, the claim that the fee arrangement violated the prohibition against self-dealing was dismissed.175
On the tax side, there was virtually no case law examining I.R.C.
§ 4975(d)(10) until the recent Ellis v. Comm’r176 case in 2015. In that
case, the tax court case addressed the payment of compensation to
an IRA owner for his role as general manager of limited liability company which was owned by the IRA.177 Under the facts of that case,
Mr. Ellis rolled monies from his employer’s I.R.C. § 401(k) plan to an
IRA and formed an LLC known as CST, in order to conduct the business of used vehicle sales.178 Mr. Ellis served as general manager of
CST.179 He then caused his IRA to acquire membership units of CST
in exchange for cash. CST paid Mr. Ellis compensation for his role as
general manager of CST, from CST’s corporate checking account,
and not from the custodial account of the IRA.180 The court noted that
Mr. Ellis was a fiduciary due to his discretionary authority over the
IRA assets and due to the fact that he exercised control over the disposition of its assets.181 The IRS argued that Mr. Ellis engaged in a

171. Id. at 908.
172. Id. at 908-09 (citing the DOL regulations set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408c2(a)).
173. Id. at 909 (stating that the legislative history of 29 U.S.C. § 1108 does not support the interpretation that 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c) merely clarifies 29 U.S. § 1108(b)(2)),
see e.g. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,
5092; Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1216 & n. 4 (2d Cir. 1987).
174. Harley v. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co., 284 F.3d 901, 909 (8th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 872 (2003).
175. Id. at 908-09.
176. Ellis v. Comm’r, 787 F.3d 123 (8th Cir. 2015).
177. Ellis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2013-245 (Oct. 29, 2013).
178. Id. at 4-6.
179. Id. at 5.
180. Id. at 6-7.
181. Id. at 16.
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prohibited transaction at the time his IRA invested in CST, as the investment was part of an arrangement whereby it was expected that
later prohibited transactions would occur under I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(D) or (E).182 Citing to the Swanson case (to be discussed
later in this article), the court held that there was no prohibited transaction when Mr. Ellis’ IRA invested in CST, as CST had no outstanding owners or ownership interest before such investment, and thus
was not a disqualified person at the time of the initial investment.183
After the initial investment, CST would become a disqualified person
as Mr. Ellis was a shareholder of 50% or more of the outstanding
ownership interest in CST.184 While Mr. Ellis argued that payment of
compensation by CST was not a prohibited transaction as such payments did not consist of plan income or assets of his IRA, but instead
from a company in which his IRA initially invested, the court dismissed the claim as “in reality CST and Mr. Ellis’ IRA were substantially the same entity.”185 The IRS argued that the payment of compensation by CST to Mr. Ellis was a transfer of plan income or assets
for his own benefit in violation of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) and caused
Mr. Ellis to deal with the income or assets of his IRA for his own
interest or for his own account in violation of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E).186
Mr. Ellis then pointed to the statute the exemption in I.R.C. §
4975(d)(10), thereby permitting the payment of compensation by
CST to him. The court rejected this as the amounts paid by CST were
not for services provided in the administration of the plan in managing its investments, but instead were for his role as general manager
of CST.187
Mr. Ellis appealed to the Eighth Circuit, who affirmed the Tax
Court’s decision.188 The record established that Mr. Ellis caused his
IRA to invest a substantial majority of its value in CST with the expectation that he would receive compensation for his services as general manager. According to the Eight Circuit, Mr. Ellis’ direction to
CST to pay him wages from funds that were received almost exclusively from his IRA was an indirect transfer of the income and assets
of the IRA for his own benefit and an indirect dealing with such income and assets for his own interest or his own account, in violation

182. Id. at 19, 21.
183. Id. at 17-19 (quoting from the case of Swanson v. Comr., 106 T.C. 76, 88 (1996)).
184. Id. at 20. (finding that CST satisfied the definition of a disqualified person
under I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G)).
185. Id. at 21.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 21-22.
188. Ellis v. Comm’r, 787 F.3d 1213, 1217 (8th Cir. 2015).
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of both I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) and (E).189 The Court did not address
whether the exemption under I.R.C. § 4975(d)(10) was applicable as
that exemption applies only to compensation for services rendered
in the performance of plan duties, not for his services as general manager of CST.190 But we see from the IRS’ appellate brief that it continues to maintain even if the payments for compensation for services to
the plan met the requirements of I.R.C. § 4975(d)(2) and (10), they
could be exempt from the violations of the per se prohibited transactions, but not the fiduciary prohibited transactions.191 Interestingly,
given the Eighth Circuit’s position in Harley decision, had the compensation in the Ellis decision been for the compensation of services
rendered to the plan, and not for running a business, the court may
not have agreed with the IRS’ interpretation.
Bank Deposits: ERISA § 408(b)(4) and I.R.C. § 4975(d)(4)
These statutory exemptions are relied upon by banks when advising its clients on IRA investments and on IRA rollovers, provided
the IRA is designed to invest exclusively in the one or more bank’s
deposit products (e.g., a certificate of deposit).192 The exemption for
Deposit IRAs requires the following: (1) the product must be offered
by a bank and subject to the supervision and examination of a federal
or state banking authority; (2) it must act similarly as any other IRA;
the product is available through the bank and the bank’s branches,
which serve as the IRA trustee or custodian; (3) the initial documentation establishing the Deposit IRA states that the IRA owner intents
to restrict the IRA assets exclusively to the deposits offered by the
bank; (4) the deposits must bear a reasonable interest rate, but the
bank may charge services fees; and (5) the Deposit IRA may or may
not be subject to trust or custodian fees to cover such services.193 Such
statutory exemption permits the IRA’s investment in the bank deposit accounts, which otherwise would have been an impermissible
lending of money or extension of credit between the IRA and the
bank (i.e., a trustee or custodian), violating I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B), and
the use of IRA assets by or for the benefit of a disqualified person

189. Id. at 1216-1217.
190. Id. at 1217.
191. Brief for the Appellee, Terry L. Ellis; Sheila K. Ellis v. Comm’r, No. 14-1310
(8th Cir. 2014) (referring to the DOL regulations which do not exempt a fiduciary’s
use of plan assets in his own interest or for his own account under I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(E), under 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.408b-2(b), 2550.408c-2(a)).
193. See 29 U.S.C. § 408(b)(4) (2018), I.R.C. § 4975(d)(4) (2018).
193. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-4 (2020), Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(b).
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(i.e., the bank), violating I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D), as well as the fiduciary self-dealing prohibition of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E).
This exemption is also relied upon by banks for other necessary
services permitted under ERISA § 408(b)(2). In DOL Adv. Op. 88-2A,
the DOL affirmed that a bank could assess a fee for sweeping uninvested plan assets into unaffiliated money market funds (referred to
as “sweep services”) in order for the uninvested funds to accrue interest.194
Benefit Distributions: I.R.C. § 4975(d)(9)
This statutory exemption permits the fiduciary to distribute
benefits owed to a participant or beneficiary, provided they are determined and paid on a basis consistent with the terms of the plan as
applied to all other plan participants and beneficiaries.195 The literal
language of the statute in I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) would have prevented the transfer of funds from the plan to a plan participant or
beneficiary who could be a disqualified person.196 The IRA rules require contributions to ordinarily be in the form of cash, but there is
no prohibition with respect to “in kind” distributions of property; the
issue for the IRS would be the proper valuation of such property for
purposes of the income tax rules. However, a separate issue arises
where the IRA asset is a house that the IRA owner intends to use as
a personal residence after distribution from the IRA.
Investment Advice:
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 added another statutory exemption under ERISA § 408(g) and I.R.C. § 4975(f)(8).197 A qualified
fiduciary adviser may rely upon this exemption so as to provide investment advice that is well suited to a participant or beneficiary of
a self-directed defined contribution plan (including an IRA), as long
as the advice is given through an eligible investment advice arrangement. The exemptions extend not only to the investment advice provided, but any transactions entered into as a result of the advice and
the payment of fees or other compensation related to the advice or

194. DOL Adv. Ops. 88-2A (Feb. 2, 1988).
195. I.R.C. § 4975(d)(9) (2018).
196. I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) (2018).
197. 29 C.F.R. § 408(g), I.R.C. § 4975(f)(8), added by Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 601(b)(2)
and § 601(a)(2), respectively, and amended by the Worker, Retiree, and Employer
Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-458, § 106(a), generally effective for investment
advice provided beginning in 2007.
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the investment transaction. The parameters of the exemption are as
follows:
A qualified fiduciary advisor is someone who is regulated by
applicable banking, insurance, or securities laws. An eligible investment advice arrangement exists for a qualified fiduciary advisor to
provide advice to an employer-sponsored plan, IRAs, Archer MSAs,
health savings accounts (HSAs), and Coverdell education savings accounts; the arrangement either provides that adviser fees do not vary
as a result of the investment option selected (referred to as fee-leveling plans) or the advice is generated from a computer model satisfying certain conditions.198
Investment advice under the fee-leveling model must satisfy the
following criteria: (1) be consistent with generally accepted investment theories; (2) take into account management fees and other fees
considered in the recommended investments; and (3) information
that the advisor has to take into account due to the participant’s risk
tolerance, other investments, other income sources, investment preferences, current age and expected retirement age.199
For advice provided by the adviser using the computer-driven
model, the model must: (1) be consistent with generally accepted investment theories; (2) take into account management fees and other
fees included in the recommended investment; (3) adequately consider the factors used in estimating future returns of investment options: (4) take into consideration a plan participant’s risk tolerance,
other investments, other sources of income, investment preferences,
current age, and expected retirement age; (5) use objective criteria for
available investment options; and (6) not lien on investment options
or the adviser or his affiliates that generate greater income for such
individuals.200
Transactions with Service Providers:
In connection with the sale of property, loans or other extension
of credits, or transfer or use of IRA assets with a disqualified person
(who is one solely because it provides services or has certain relationships with the service provider to the plan), payment of compensation may be made for services rendered by the plan or IRA as long
as adequate consideration (meaning not less nor more) is paid.201

198.
199.
200.
201.

29 C.F.R. § 408(g) (2020), I.R.C. § 4975(f)(8) (2020).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.408g-1(b)(3) (2020).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.408g-1(b)(4)(ii) (2020).
29 C.F.R. § 1108(b)(17) (2020), I.R.C. § 4975(d)(20) (2018).
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This statutory exemption for service providers is found in I.R.C. §
4975(d)(20) and ERISA § 408(b)(17), as added in 2006, and is applicable in many arms-length transactions with third parties. The exemption is not applicable to a fiduciary (or its affiliate) who has or exercises any discretionary authority or control involving the investment
of plan assets involved in the transaction or who provides investment advice regarding the plan assets.
Correction of a Prohibited Transaction:
Correction of a prohibited transaction is permitted with respect
to the purchase, holding, or sale of a security or commodity if it is
done within 14 days after the date the party in interest discovers or
reasonably discovers that the transaction was prohibited.202 Such rule
is not applicable to sales or purchases of employer security or employer real property, nor if the fiduciary knew or should have known
at the time of the transaction, that is was a prohibited transaction.
When applicable, the correction requires undoing the transaction, if
possible, and making whole the plan or restoring any losses. Excise
taxes can be abated after assessment or refunded or credited after
they have been collected.203
Other Types of Exemptions:
ERISA § 408(a) and I.R.C. §4975(c)(2) envision that other exemptions can be granted, other than the statutory ones listed. ERISA and
the Code authorize the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the
Treasury to grant a conditional or unconditional exemption of any
class of transactions from all or part of the restrictions set forth in
ERISA §§ 406 and 407(a) and from taxes imposed by I.R.C. § 4975(a)
and (b). Under section 102 of the Reorganization Plan No. 4, of 1978,
the DOL has been given jurisdiction over the issuance of administrative exemptions.204 The DOL’s Office of Exemption Determination,
which is part of the Employee Benefits Security Administration
(EBSA), handles the processing of prohibited transaction exemption

202. 29 C.F.R. § 408(b)(20) (2020), I.R.C. §§ 4975(d)(23), (f)(11) (2018), added by Pub.
L. No. 109-280, § 612, effective for transactions occurring after August 17, 2006.
203. I.R.C. § 4975(f)(11)(C) (2018).
204. See the reference to the Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 4, of 1978, supra
footnote 44.
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applications.205 The statute permits the issuance of an administrative
exemption provided it is: “(1) administratively feasible, (2) in the interests of the plan and of its participants and beneficiaries, and (3)
protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of such
plan.”206 Generally, exemptions are granted for per se prohibited
transactions; exemptions from the fiduciary prohibited transactions
require an administrative hearing and a determination that the three
elements above have been satisfied.207Administrative exemptions
can be issued individually (for the identified party) or for a class of
disqualified persons (referred as class prohibited transaction exemptions or PTEs). Before the DOL issues a class exemption, it must publish the proposed exemption in the Federal Register to solicit public
comments.208
Class Exemptions Relevant to IRAs:
The following class exemptions provide relief from the prohibited transaction rules for a fiduciary or party in interest/disqualified
person provided the conditions have been satisfied and may be relevant to IRAs:
(1) PTE 75-1: This exemption allows routine buys and sales of
securities between an IRA and a broker-dealer if the following elements are met: the broker-dealer normally buys and sells securities
on its own account as part of its ordinary course of business; for a
reporting dealer or bank, it ordinarily buys and sells government securities for its own account, and the buy or sell between the plan and
the reporting dealer or bank is for the buy or sale of government securities; the transactions is an arm’s length transaction with an unrelated buyer or seller; the broker-dealer or reporting dealer or bank is
not a fiduciary with respect to the plan; and records are maintained

205. See 29 C.F.R. § 2570-30 through § 2570.52 for the process for filing and processing prohibited transaction exemption applications (which explains who may apply; what information should be included; when a conference with the DOL may be
requested; when a request for reconsideration of a DOL decision can be made; and
how the DOL and the applicant will notify interested persons if the DOL warrants a
tentative approval). See also a booklet published by the DOL explaining its regulations and applicable laws in this regard, at DOL, Exception Procedures under Federal
Pension Law, Regulations 76 Fed Reg 208 (2011), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications/exemption-procedures-under-federal-pension-law.pdf
206. 29 C.F.R. § 1108(a) (2020), I.R.C. § 4975(c)(2) (2020).
207. 29 C.F.R. § 1108(a) (2020); see also I.R.C. § 4975(c)(2) (2018).
208. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2570.30 (2020) et seq. for the procedures to be followed to
requesting an exemption.
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for a minimum of six years to ascertain whether the elements of the
exemption were met.209
(2) PTE 77-4: This exemption allows IRAs to buy open-end investment company shares (e.g., mutual fund shares) in the context
where the mutual fund investment adviser is a fiduciary to the plan
(or an affiliate of such fiduciary).210 The following elements must be
satisfied: no sales commission is assessed or paid relative to the buy
or sale; no redemption fee is remitted to the investment company relative to the sale unless it is paid only to the investment company and
the existence of such fee is disclosed in the securities prospectus at
the time of the buy or sale; no investment management, investment
advisory, or similar fee may be paid for the entire duration of the
investment; and a second independent fiduciary receives disclosures
and reviews it to determine the purchase is suitable for the plan.211
(3) PTE 80-26: This exemption allows IRA owners or other disqualified persons to lend money to the IRA for a very short time to
cover ordinary operating expenses, or for a purpose incidental to the
ordinary operation of the plan.212 This exemption is relevant if the
IRA’s assets are illiquid and insufficient to meet short-term needs
(e.g., payment of required minimum distributions). To comply with
the exemption, the following elements must be met: no interest may
be charged to the plan; the proceeds are used solely to cover ordinary
operating expenses or for other purposes incidental to the ordinary
operation of the plan; the loan must be unsecured; the loan is not
being made directly or indirectly by another plan; if the term of the
loan is 60 days or longer, it must be made pursuant to a written loan
agreement describing all material terms.213
(4) PTE 84-14: This exemption was granted for certain financial
institutions (e.g., banks, federally insured savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and registered investment advisers) who
acknowledge their fiduciary status relative to the plan in writing.214
The exemption permits transactions with counterparties who may be

209. PTE 75-1, 40 Fed. Reg. 50845 (Oct. 31, 1975).
210. PTE 77-4, 42 Fed. Reg. 18732 (Apr. 8, 1977).
211. Id. The DOL disclosed to SunTrust Banks that PTE 77-4 is available to IRAs.
See DOL Adv. Op. 1993-26A (Sept. 9, 1993).
212. PTE 80-26, 45 Fed. Reg. 28545 (Apr. 29, 1980), amended by 65 Fed. Reg. 17540
(Apr. 3, 2000) and 67 Fed. Reg. 9485 (Mar. 1, 2002).
213. PTE 80-26, 45 Fed. Reg. 28545 (Apr. 29, 1980)
214. PTE 84014, 49 Fed. Reg. 9494 (Mar. 13, 1984), corrected by 50 Fed. Reg. 41430
(Oct. 10, 1985), and amended by PTE 2002-13, 67 Fed. Reg. 9483 (Mar. 1, 2002) (clarifying that the terms “employee benefit plan” and “plan” include IRAs and Keogh
plans).

52

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22.1

disqualified service providers (or their affiliates) if the plan assets are
managed by a qualified professional asset manager (QPAM) that is
independent of the parties in interest. Such QPAMs must have met
certain minimum capital and asset requirements.215 This exemption
eliminates the necessity for plan investment managers to track all
parties in interest that may also be investing in the investment funds
under their management. In the self-directed IRA context, this exemption would be relevant in the case of an IRA investing in a partnership or another entity that holds plan assets, permitting the manager of the entity to rely on the exemption so as to allow the entity to
engage in portfolio investment transactions.
(4) PTE 86-128: This exemption allows certain fiduciaries (and
affiliates) to receive fees (e.g., 12b-1 fees, commissions) for “effecting
or executing” securities transactions as an agent for a plan (including
an IRA) or a pooled investment fund. The trading may not be excessive in amount or frequency (referred to as “churning”).216 Disclosures must be made. Normally, ERISA’s self- dealing rules would
prohibit a fiduciary from using his authority or control to affect or
increase his own compensation. The fiduciary is allowed to act as an
agent in an agency cross transaction (e.g., agent to both the plan and
one or more other parties), and to receive reasonable compensation
for effecting or executing the agency cross transaction from one or
more of the other parties to the transaction. The exemption requires
disclosure and approval by an independent fiduciary; such elements
are not applicable to IRAs.217
(5) PTE 91-55: IRC § 408(m) states that investment by the IRA in
collectibles (which includes coins) will be treated as a distribution for
purposes of IRC § 402.218 This exemption states that collectibles do
not include gold and silver American Eagle coins and other IRSallowed gold, silver, and platinum coins and bullion.219 PTE 91-55
allows the IRA to buy and sell American Eagle bullion coins in principal transactions to and from broker dealers, who are authorized

215. PTE 84014, 49 Fed. Reg. 9494 (Mar. 13, 1984) (requiring banks and savings
and loan associations to have equity capital or net worth in excess of $1 million; requiring insurance companies to have net worth in excess of $1 million; and requiring
registered investment advisers to have total client assets under management in excess of $85 million and either shareholders’ or partners’ equity in excess of $1 million).
216. PTE 86-128, 51 Fed. Reg. 41686 (Nov. 18, 1986).
217. Id. at 41696.
218. I.R.C. § 408(m)(1)-(3) (2018).
219. Id.
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buyers of such coins and serve as non-bank custodians for the IRA.220
Under the exemption, the IRA may engage in principal transactions
from and to the broker-dealer (including interest-free extension of
credit), provided the broker-dealer is not a fiduciary to the IRA; the
transaction is arms’ length; and the transaction is settled in 10 days
(mandatory).
(6) PTE 93-1: This exemption allows nominal “gifts” (e.g., something no more than $20 in value) to be given by financial institutions
to IRA owners for establishing an account.221 This is the proverbial
toaster exemption.
(7) PTE 93-33: This exemption allows banks to offer reduced or
free services (e.g., free checking account with no fees) for the IRA
owner or a family member for establishing an account, if certain conditions are met.222 It extends protection to other individuals with a
beneficial interest in the IRA. Note that PTE 97-11 offers a similar exemption for IRAs established with a brokerage firm.223
(8) PTE 97-11: This exemption allows broker-dealers registered
under the Securities Exchange Act to offer reduced or free services
for the individual or a family member for establishing an IRA, SEP,
Keogh or SIMPLE plan. This exemption allows the broker-dealer to
consider the value of certain retirement accounts and personal accounts of the owner (referred to as “householding of brokerage accounts”) in determining its fee for its brokerage services. One type of
plan excluded from the list of plans to aggregate is a participant’s
account in an ERISA plan (e.g., I.R.C. § 401(k) plan). The following
conditions apply to meet the exemption:
•

•
•

The plan being considered in determining eligibility to receive no or low-cost services must be established and maintained for the exclusive benefit of
the participants covered under the plan and beneficiaries;
The brokerage services must be of the type that the
broker-dealer can provide in adherence with all applicable federal and state laws;
The brokerage services to the plan are the same as
provided in the ordinary course of the broker-

220. Id.
221. PTE 93-1, 58 Fed. Reg. 3567 (Jan. 11, 1993).
222. PTE 93-33, 58 Fed. 31053 (May 19, 1993), amended by, 64 Fed. Reg. 11044 (Mar.
8, 1999). This exemption is applicable to IRAs and Keogh plans that are Title I employee benefit plans.
223. PTE 97-11, 62 Fed. Reg. 5855 (Feb. 7, 1997).
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dealer’s business to other customers who qualify
for reduced or no cost services, but who have not
established a plan with the broker-dealer;
The combined total of all fees for the services to the
plan cannot exceed reasonable compensation;
The investment performance for the plan is no less
favorable than that of an identical investment that
could have been made at the same by a customer of
the broker-dealer who was not eligible for discounted or free services; and
The brokerage services to the plan customer must
be the same as are offered to non-plan customers
with account values of the same amount or the
same amount of fees generated.224

PTE 97-11 defines “account value” as investments in cash and
securities under the plan for which market quotes are readily available.225 The exemption defines “fees” as “commissions and other fees
received by the broker-dealer … for the provision of services, including, but not limited to, brokerage commissions, investment management fees, custodial fees, and administrative fees.”226
Important Questions to Ask in the Self-Directed IRA Context
The following sets forth the guidance presently available
through caselaw or agency guidance that is particularly relevant in
the self-directed IRA context, discussing IRAs in transactions with
family members; IRAs involved in impermissible loans or other extension of credit; the IRA’s investment in a family business or an entity related to the IRA owner or a family member; IRAs involved with
real estate investments; and IRAs in the context of estate planning
needs.
IRA Transactions involving Family Members:
The case of Harris v. Comm’r, as discussed earlier, taught that the
IRA’s investment in the owner’s personal residence was a prohibited
transaction under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) (as an impermissible “use by
or for the benefit … of the income or assets of a plan” by the owner

224. Id. at 5856-57.
225. Id. at 5857.
226. Id.
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who was deemed to be a disqualified person).227 The Tax Court rejected all three of the IRA owners’ arguments: (1) the investment in
the home was made by the IRA account and not by the IRA owners
personally; (2) the home was not collectible within the meaning of
I.R.C. § 408(m), and thus was a permissible IRA investment; and (3)
as a consequence of the foregoing, there was no distribution of IRA
funds to the IRA owners.228 A similar result occurs when a family
member of the IRA owner uses the residence. Sometimes forgotten
with the purchase of real estate by the IRA is the fact that many mortgagors require a personal guarantee by the IRA owner for the mortgage; such extension of credit would involve a prohibited transaction
as it is unlikely the requirements for PTE 80-26 could be met (as discussed earlier).
The DOL Adv. Op. 82-08A involved a company’s request as to
whether loans from three IRAs would be a prohibited transaction,
where the three IRA owners and their brother owned 100% of the
corporation.229 Although the DOL did not address the question of
whether the company was a disqualified person, it clearly would not
have been as the siblings were not family members for purposes of
each of the three IRAs per I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(F). Thus, their ownership in the corporation could not be considered in determining
whether the company was a disqualified person per I.R.C. §
4975(e)(2)(G); nor could the constructive receipt rules of I.R.C §
267(c) apply as siblings are not family members for purposes of combining their ownership in a common corporation, as I.R.C. § 267(c)(4)
is modified by I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(F). Note, had the company been a
disqualified person relative to the three IRAs, any loans from the
IRAs would have been a per se prohibited transaction under I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(B) (a loan or other extension of credit).
However, the DOL stated that the three brothers were disqualified persons with respect to their own IRAs as it regarded them as
fiduciaries relative to their IRA due to their power to direct their investments. As such, they are prohibited from dealing with the income or assets of a plan “in his or her own interest or for his or her
own account,” per I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E). Similarly, the IRS regulations admonish fiduciaries not to enter into transactions when those
fiduciaries have interest which may affect their exercise of judgment.230As the company is a party in whom the brothers have an

227.
228.
229.
230.

Harris v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. 1983 (1994).
Id. at 1984-85.
DOL Op. Ltr. 82-08A (Feb. 1, 1982).
Id. (quoting from Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a)(5)).
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interest that might affect their best judgment as fiduciaries, a loan
from their IRAs to the company would likely be a prohibited act of
self-dealing under I.R.C. § 4975(e)(1)(E) or an indirect transfer of plan
assets to, or a use of plan assets for the benefit of, a disqualified person under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D).
The DOL Adv. Op. 93-33A involved an IRA owner requesting
guidance on his IRA’s purchase and then subsequent lease-back of a
tax-exempt school’s land and high school, which was founded by his
daughter and son-in-law (who were the sole directors and officers of
the school).231 The purchase was to be at fair market value, but the
lease-back would be at the fair-market rent or below market rent depending on the school’s ability to pay. The IRA owner was held to be
a fiduciary due to his investment discretion over the IRA assets, and
his daughter and son-in-law were found to be disqualified persons
to the IRA as they were family members per IR.C. § 4975(e)(2)(F).
Thus, the DOL found the sale and lease-back arrangement between
the IRA and the school to be a use of plan assets for the benefit of
disqualified persons, in violation of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D). If the
transaction were also part of an agreement in which the fiduciary
caused the plan assets to be used in a manner designed to benefit any
person in whom such fiduciary had an interest, there would be violations of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) and (E). The DOL then referred the
IRA owner to the IRS regulations for an illustration of the latter violations. Under the regulations, if a plan fiduciary retained his son to
provide necessary services to the plan regarding its operations for a
fee, the fiduciary would be engaging in an I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E) violation because his son is a person in whom the fiduciary had an interest that may affect the exercise of his best judgment.232 Thus, the
IRA owner’s purchase of real estate subject to an arrangement to
lease it back to the school at a rent that was dependent on the school’s
ability to pay benefited the IRA’s family member, violating I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(D) and (E).
The DOL Adv. Op. 2000-10A involved an IRA owner directing
his IRA to invest in a limited partnership, in which relatives and the
IRA owner (in his individual capacity) were partners. Mr. Alder and
his family members had a minority interest in family partnership
(which meant the family partnership was not a disqualified person),
for which Mr. Alder was general partner.233 Then, Mr. Alder directed
his IRA to invest in the partnership, which would then become a

231. DOL Adv. Op. 93-33A (Dec. 16, 1993).
232. Id. (quoting from Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a)(6), Example (6)).
233. DOL Adv. Op. 2000-10A (July 27, 2000).
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limited partnership; the IRA’s interest will be 39.38%, a minority interest in the limited partnership, and Mr. Alder was to be its general
partner. As the partnership was not a disqualified person at the time
of the purchase, there should have been no prohibited transaction by
virtue of the IRA purchasing the partnership per the Swanson case.
Mr. Alder represents that he does not and will not receive any compensation from the partnership; nor will he have an investment management functions with respect to the assets of the partnership.
In determining whether any prohibited transactions occurred or
will occur, the DOL notes that Mr. Alder is a fiduciary due to his
investment discretion over his IRA assets, and thus a disqualified
person; he is also a disqualified person in his capacity as general partner of the partnership, to the extent he exercises discretionary authority over the administration or management of the IRA assets invested in the partnership. Although Mr. Alder, his son and his
daughter are also disqualified persons, the transaction is between the
IRA and the partnership, and not with Mr. Adler and his family (except as fellow investors in the partnership). Since Mr. Alder only
owns 6.52% of the partnership after the IRA purchases its share of
the partnership, the DOL states that the partnership is not a qualified
person per I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G). That seems surprising since after
the purchase, the following related parties’ ownership interest in the
limited partnership is as follows: Alder’s IRA 39.38%, Alder’s 6.52%,
son’s 3.07%, and daughter’s 1.35%, totally 50.32%. Hence, it would
appear the limited partnership is a disqualified person after the
IRA’s purchase. But as the DOL concludes that the partnership is not
a disinterested person, it holds that the IRA’s purchase of an interest
in the partnership does not constitute a per se prohibited transaction.234
This opinion begs the question of whether the IRA could own
an entity that becomes a disqualified person as a result of the IRA’s
purchase of a portion of the entity, or whether that would be a per se
prohibited transaction because of its power to vote or otherwise participate in the management of the entity and to receive dividends or
other profits from the entity. Since Mr. Alder is a general partner of
the limited partnership after the IRA’s purchase, it does not appear
that his exercise of management powers as a general partner (who is
a disqualified person) is a per se prohibited transaction.
The DOL Adv. Op. 2006-09A involved the IRA owner directing
his IRA to invest in notes being offered by a corporation, in which

234. Id.
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the IRA owner’s son-in-law had an 87.5% ownership interest.235 The
DOL concluded the IRA owner was a fiduciary due to his ability to
direct investments, and that his son-in-law was also a disqualified
person under I.R.C. § 4975(e)(6). Due to the son-in-law’s majority interest in the corporation, the corporation was also a disqualified person per I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G)(i). Hence, the IRA’s purchase of the
notes from the corporation would be both a sale or exchange of property in violation of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A) and lending of money or
other extension of credit in violation of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B). The
opinion letter was silent on the appropriate penalty for engaging in
the prohibited transaction – a 15% excise tax assessed against the corporation or disqualification of the IRA. Arguably the IRA owner did
not “engage” in the transaction as it was between the IRA and the
corporation, which would save the IRA from disqualification.
In the case of In re Daniels, the bankruptcy court found multiple
prohibited transactions thereby granting the trustee’s motion for
summary judgment.236 The debtor was the sole participant, trustee,
administrator, and employer of a profit sharing plan.237 Over the life
of the plan, the debtor engaged in a number of transactions with family members, many of these done through the Walker Realty Trust
(Realty Trust), for which he was sole trustee and his spouse was the
sole beneficiary.238 The debtor’s wife assigned her beneficial interest
in the Realty Trust to the plan.239 The debtor deposited the rent and
sales proceeds from property held by the Realty Trust directly into
the profit sharing plan and used plan assets to pay real estate taxes
and other management costs associated with the properties held by
the trust.240 The debtor’s son and daughter-in-law paid rent on real
property owned by the Realty Trust, which the debtor deposited into
the plan as rental checks.241 The debtor testified that some or all of
these rental checks were in connection with a “lease and sale agreement” with his son, such that he could later buy the property. After
ten years of payments, a given amount of the lease payments were
credited against the purchase price and there was a “gift of equity”
from the debtor to his son.242 The IRS held that the loan made by the
plan to the debtor’s son was a prohibited transaction. In another

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

DOL Adv. Op. 2006-09A (Dec. 19, 2006).
In re Daniels, 452 B.R. 335 (Bankr. D. Mass Ct. 2011).
Id. at 339.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 341.
Id.
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transaction, the debtor made payments from the plan to Mr. Florence
for services he rendered for the properties held by the Realty Trust
and made a sale of real estate and a loan to Mr. Florence’s daughter
from the plan.243
The bankruptcy court found the debtor, his son, daughter-inlaw, and wife to be disqualified persons, and thus all real estate sales
and leases between the plan and them were prohibited transactions.244 It found the sale of real estate and extension of a loan to Mr.
Florence’s daughter (a disqualified person) to be prohibited.245 The
wife’s assignment of her interest in Realty Trust to the plan effectively merged the interests of the plan and trust, causing it to be a
fiduciary prohibited transaction, in accordance with I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(E) and (F), as the debtor dealt with the plan assets for his
own interest by investing them in a business venture in which the
debtor had individually invested.246
In the case of In re Kellerman, Mr. Kellerman and his wife each
owned a 50% interest in Panther Mountain Land Development, LLC
(Panther Mountain).247 Mr. Kellerman created an IRA, which formed
a partnership (Entrust Partnership) with Panther Mountain (each being a 50% partner) in order to buy and develop real estate.248 The
partnership agreement called upon the IRA to deliver the real property as a noncash contribution and to make a cash contribution,
whereas Panther Mountain made only a cash contribution.249 One
day later, Mr. Kellerman directed the IRA to liquidate some of the
assets and purchase a four-acre tract of land, to “complement and
assist” in the development two nearby tracts of land, owned by Panther Mountain.250 At issue in the bankruptcy case was the debtors’
exemption of the IRA.251
The debtors conceded that they were disqualified persons pursuant to I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2) (Mr. Kellerman as fiduciary to the IRA
due to his discretionary authority and his spouse as a family member); that Panther Mountain was a disqualified person under I.R.C. §
4975(e)(2)(G) due to Mr. Kellerman’s 50% interest; and that the Entrust Partnership was a disqualified person under I.R.C. §

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 350.
In re Kellerman, 531 B.R. 219, 221 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2015).
Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 223.
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4975(e)(2)(G) due to Mr. Kellerman’s ownership in Panther Mountain.252 The court cites the In re Cherwenka case and a DOL opinion
letter mentioned in that case for the proposition that the IRA may
invest in a partnership and a violation of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) or (E)
does not necessarily occur “merely because the fiduciary derives
some incidental benefit from the transaction involving IRA assets.”253
Thus, the court finds that Mr. Kellerman engaged the IRA in transactions involving the purchase and conveyance of real property between the IRA and Panther Mountain and the cash contribution
made by the IRA to the Entrust Partnership, violating I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(B), (D), and (E), rendering the IRA non-exempt.254 The
facts also indicate that Panther Mountain used the IRA as a lending
source for the purchase price and development of the land, without
any commensurate input from Panther Mountain, violating I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(B).255 The court then cited the Rollins case in holding that
the Kellerman used the IRA to indirectly secure additional financing
on behalf of Panther Mountain “without having to deal with independent lenders,” in violation of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D).256
All of the above advisory opinions and cases illustrate that a
self-directed IRA engaging in transactions with corporations or other
entities that are effectively controlled by the IRA owner and/or his
family members face the likelihood of the DOL and IRS finding per
se prohibited transactions, as well as fiduciary prohibited transactions due to the fact that the IRA owner’s best judgment would be
affected because of his or the family’s involvement with the corporation or entity. As noted in ERISA Op. Ltr. 82-02A, there was no per se
prohibited transaction as the corporation who would be receiving a
loan from the IRA was not a disqualified person.257 However, the
DOL had no problem characterizing the IRA’s loan to the corporation as self-dealing by the IRA owner, as fiduciary, or an indirect
transfer of IRA assets to, or a use of them, for the benefit of the IRA
owner.
IRA Transactions involving Impermissible Loans or Other

252. Id. at 224-25.
253. Id. at 226 (quoting from Cherwenka, 508 B.R. at 239 and DOL Op. Ltr. 200010A (July 27, 2000).
254. Id. at 227.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 227-28.
257. DOL Op. Ltr. 82-02A (Jan. 6, 1982).
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Extensions of Credit
In the case of Janpol v. Comm’r, Janpol and Berlin were 50%
shareholder of AJVW, which established a profit sharing plan for
which they were trustees.258 The DOL sent them a letter stating that
the plan’s purchase of customer notes from AJVW, the leasing of real
property to AJVW, and receipt of loans from Berlin and Janpol to the
plan constituted prohibited transactions.259 Janpol and Berlin took
the position that only loans from a plan to a disqualified person were
prohibited, not loans to the plan from a disqualified person.260 The
Tax Court disagreed and affirmed that any loan between the plan
and a disqualified person is prohibited under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B),
with parallel requirements under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(B).261
In the consolidated case of Peek v. Comm’r and Fleck v. Comm’r,262
the Court examined facts whereby two taxpayers established traditional IRAs and used the plan assets to each purchase 50% of FP Corporation’s (FP) stock. At the formation of FP, the taxpayers had intended that FP would purchase most of the assets of another
corporation (AFS) to engage in a business.263 In FP’s purchase of
AFS’s assets, it gave a promissory note to the sellers of AFS, secured
by the personal guaranties of the IRA owners.264 The Court held that
the taxpayer’s personal guarantees of the FP’s loans to be an indirect
extension of credit to the IRA, thereby prohibited under I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(B).265 The court reasoned that the intent of the prohibited
transaction rules was to prohibit the IRA owner’s loan guarantees,
whether made directly to their IRAs or indirectly to their IRAs by
way of a corporation owned by the IRAs; to interpret otherwise
would allow an IRA to create a shell subsidiary to whom the disqualified person could then make a loan in order to circumvent the
rule.266
In TAM 8849001, the taxpayer was a one-sixth shareholder in
his employer and participated in the employer’s profit sharing and

258. Janpol v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 518, 520 (1993), which was consolidated with the
case of Berlin v. Comm’r.
259. Id. at 520-21.
260. Id. at 525.
261. Id.
262. 140 T.C. 216, 224 (2013).
263. Id. at 220. (with both Mr. Peek and Mr. Fleck intending to serve as corporate
officers and directors of the FP Company).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 225.
266. Id.
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money purchase plan, borrowing $50,000 from the profit sharing
plan. Upon plan termination, the taxpayer received cash distributions of $472,865 from the plans, including a minority partnership
interest. As a result, the taxpayer established an IRA, transferring the
$431,680 in cash, a note with a balance of $41,184, and the partnership
interest. The IRS held that the transfer of the taxpayer’s note to the
IRA and the holding of the note by the IRA constituted a prohibited
transaction as a direct or indirect lending or money or other extension of credit between the plan and a disqualified person under I.R.C.
§ 4975(c)(1)(B).
In the case of Flahertys Arden Bowl, Inc. v. Commissioner,267 the
Tax Court examined facts in which the taxpayer owned 57% of the
common stock of Flaherty Arden Bowl, Inc. (Flahertys) and was a
participant under his employer’s qualified profit sharing plan and
qualified pension plan. U.S. Bank, National Association, was the successor trustee of both plans, which permitted the participant to selfdirect the investments of its accounts.268 The taxpayer directed the
trustee to lend $200,100 to Flahertys from his profit sharing account
and to lend $25,900 to Flahertys from his pension account.269 As the
taxpayer was a fiduciary by virtue of his ability to direct the management of plans’ assets and Flahertys was a disqualified person as it is
owned 50% or more by a plan fiduciary, the loans from the plans to
a disqualified person were prohibited transactions under I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(B).270
The case of In re Hughes involved a debtor borrowing monies for
his IRA and lending it to a corporation in which the debtor was the
principal, sole stockholder, and officer, but repaying it to the IRA two
months later.271 The corporation was clearly a disqualified person as
it was 50% or more owned by the IRA owner in accordance with
I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G)(i). The fact that the monies were repaid to the
IRA two months later “had no legal effect of ‘restating’ the IRA,” and
thus was irrelevant.272 Thus, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s objection of the debtor’s claim of exemption of his IRA.273 In a
similar fact pattern, the DOL examined facts in Adv. Op. 2011-04A,
in which Mr. Warfield proposed to have his IRA purchase a note and
deed of trust from his bank (for which he had a mortgage), for real
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Flahertys Arden Bowl, Inc. v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 269 (2000).
Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 273-279.
In re Hughes, 293 B.R. 528, 529 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).
Id. at 530.
Id.
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estate titled by the owner’s family trust, such that the IRA would become holder of the note and he could make payments on the note
directly to the IRA.274 While the IRA would acquire the note and deed
of trust from the bank, an unrelated party, the IRA would then hold
the note and receive payments from the IRA owner and his spouse,
disqualified persons to the IRA. In the DOL’s view, such arrangement is a prohibited extension of credit under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B)
as the holding of the note by the IRA will result in payments made
by disqualified persons (the Warfields). The DOL went on to opine
that if the acquisition and holding of the note by the IRS was part of
an agreement which caused the plan assets to be used in a manner
designed to benefit the fiduciary (Mr. Warfield) or persons in which
such fiduciary had an interest that would affect his best judgment as
fiduciary, there would be violations of the fiduciary prohibited transactions of I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D) and (E).
These above cases and regulatory guidance had no problem
finding per se prohibited transactions between the IRA and an entity
(e.g., corporation, family trust, affiliated corporation) when the IRA
or the entity lent monies to one another. In the Peek/Fleck case, the
Tax Court had no tolerance for an IRA owner making guarantees on
loans made to an entity other than the IRA, but instead an entity
owned by the IRA, finding such guarantees to be an indirect loan.275
IRA Transactions with Family Businesses or Entities
Related to the IRA Owner
The leading case involving an IRA forming a business is Swanson v. Comm’r.276 Mr. Swanson was the sole shareholder of H & S
Swansons’ Tool Company and formed a new corporation (known as
Swansons’ Worldwide (the “DISC” or “Worldwide”)) in which he
was named the initial director.277 Mr. Swanson established an IRA in
1985, retaining the power to direct its investments, and directed the
custodian to execute a subscription agreement for 2,500 shares of
Worldwide original issue stock, such that the IRA would be the sole
shareholder of Worldwide.278 From 1985 to 1988, Swansons Tool paid
commissions to Worldwide with respect to the sale by Swansons’
Tool of export property, and in turn, Mr. Swanson, as president of

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

U.S. Dep’t of Labor No. 2011-04A (Feb. 3, 2011).
Peek v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 216, 224-25 (2013).
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Worldwide, directed it to pay dividends to the IRA.279 Mr. Swanson
set up a similar arrangement with another corporation, involving a
second IRA.280
The IRS’ position was that Mr. Swanson was a disqualified person as he was a fiduciary to the IRA, due to his express authority to
control the investments of the IRA.281 As he was also an officer and
director of Worldwide, there had been a direct or indirect transaction
between Worldwide and the first IRA which was prohibited under
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A), and that the payment of dividends from
Worldwide to the IRA was an act of self-dealing which was prohibited under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E).282 The Tax Court disagreed.283 The
stock acquired by the IRA in the transaction was newly issued and
thus, Worldwide, without shares or shareholders, did not meet the
definition of a disqualified person under I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G).284
Only after Worldwide issued the stock to the IRA did Mr. Swanson
have a beneficial interest in Worldwide’s stock, causing Worldwide
then to become a disqualified person under I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G).285
As to the payment of dividends by Worldwide to the IRA, the court
held there was no support for the proposition that they constituted
acts of self-dealing, as the dividends paid did not become income of
the IRA until “unqualifiedly made subject to the demand of . . .” the
IRA.286 The only direct or indirect benefit that Mr. Swanson received
from the payment of dividends was related solely to his status as a
participant of the IRA, which I.R.C. § 4975(d)(9) affirms he can receive as a plan participant.287 The court concluded by finding the IRS’
litigation position not “substantially justified” and awarded litigation costs to the Mr. Swanson.288
Thus, the Swanson case stands for the proposition that an IRA
can initially invest in a newly created entity (e.g., corporation, LLC,
etc.) without engaging in a prohibited transaction as the newly created entity is not yet a disqualified person. Thereafter, the newly created entity may be a disqualified person depending on the IRA’s
ownership interests. Shortly after the Swanson case, the DOL issued

279.
280.
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regulations stating that a transaction between a party in interest (or
disqualified person) and a corporation or partnership in which the
plan has invested (e.g., the LLC) will generally not give rise to a prohibited transaction.289 But the regulations go on to say, due to the
prohibitions in ERISA §§ 406(a)(1)(D) and 406(b)(1), that a prohibited
transaction will occur if the plan invests in a corporation as part of an
arrangement or expectation that the corporation will engage in a transaction with a party in interest (or disqualified person).290
DOL Adv. Op. 2006-01A is illustrative of the DOL’s position
with respect to IRA’s investments in newly created LLCs which will
then transact business with entities owned by the IRA owner.291 Under the facts of the opinion, the Salon Services and Supplies, Inc. (“S
Company”) was owned by Berry (68%) and Learned (“G”) (32%),
with Payne (“R”) as its officer.292 Berry proposed to create an LLC
that will purchase land, build a warehouse, and lease property to S
Company, whereby its investors will be Berry’s IRA (49%), R’s IRA
(31%), and G (20%). R and G would manage the LLC.293 The DOL
finds Berry to be a fiduciary to his IRA due to his discretionary authority or control over its assets and management.294 Berry represents
that S is a disqualified person (as he owns 68% of S).295 The DOL finds
R to be a disqualified person with respect to Berry’s IRA as he is an
officer of S Company, per I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(H).296 While the initial
investment of Berry’s IRA in the LLC would not be a prohibited
transaction, any subsequent lease of property between the LLC and
S Company would be a prohibited transaction relative to Berry’s
IRA, as the investment was made part of an arrangement whereby
the LLC would engage in a transaction with a disqualified person (S
Company).297 The DOL continued to state that if the proposed lease
were consummated, Berry as fiduciary may violate the fiduciary prohibited transactions.298
The IRS Field Service Advisory 200128011 is a comparable example of an IRA’s investment in an LLC.299 Under the facts, Father
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owned a majority share of USCorp, with his three minor children
owning equal remaining shares.300 Father and each child own separate IRAs, which acquired a 25% interest in FSC A (a corporation).301
USCorp agreed to pay commissions to FSC A, acting as its agent in
connection with export sales, as well as performing services on behalf of FSC A for which FSC A would reimburse it for actual costs.302
During year 1, FSC A paid dividends to its IRA shareholders.303 The
IRS conceded, in light of Swanson, that the IRAs investment in FSC A
did not result in a prohibited transaction, nor did the payment of
dividends by FSC A to the IRAs.304 While FSC A was not a disqualified person, as it was owned only by 25% of each IRA, each IRA
owner were disqualified persons as fiduciaries with respect to their
IRAs and USCorp was a disqualified person with respect to Father’s
IRA, due Father’s majority owned interest in USCorp.305 Thus, the
IRS went on to say that if the transaction between USCorp and FSC
A was made for the purpose of benefitting USCorp, the IRA owners
would violate I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D), and if facts were presented to
demonstrate that the IRA owners’ interest in the transaction because
of their ownership of USCorp affected their best judgments as fiduciaries, the transaction would violate I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E).306 Thus,
the IRS shows its broad interpretation of the fiduciary prohibited
transactions to extend to transactions that do not involve disqualified
persons.
Other examples where the IRS finds actual or potential fiduciary
prohibited transactions include the following. PLR 8009091 is another example where the IRS finds no per se prohibited transactions
but cautions against possible fiduciary prohibited transactions.307
Under the facts, an individual, who is a director (but not an employee) of Corp. A and president of Corp. B (which owns 35% of
Corp. A), proposes to have his IRA purchase 5% of the total shares
of Corp. A, at fair market value.308 The individual represents that
Corp. A is not a disqualified person relative to his IRA. The IRS
agrees that the IRA’s purchase of stock is not a per se prohibited transaction, but cautions the IRA owner as plan fiduciary that should he
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benefit, directly or indirectly, from the purchase of stock (e.g., the
IRA’s purchase assures his reelection as director of Corp. A or benefits him in his position as president of Corp. B), then the purchase
would constitute a prohibited transaction under I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(D), (E), (F).309 Given the inherently factual determination,
the Service would not issue a ruling on that question.310 In PLR
9119002, Individual A was a co-trustee of Trust B, which is a trust
underlying the plan adopted by Company B, and owned 39% interest in Partnership Y.311 Monies were transferred from Trust B to Partnership Y, in exchanged for an unsecured promissory note.312 While
the IRS does not comment, Partnership Y was not a disqualified person as it was not owned at least 50% by Individual A, a fiduciary to
Trust B as co-trustee.313 The IRS held that Individual A, as partner
with a substantial ownership interest in Partnership Y, would benefit
from the plan loan and thus participated in a prohibited transaction
under I.R.C. § 4975(c).314 In TAM 9208001, Individual M & Co. is a
solely owned firm by Individual M, which sponsors a qualified
plan.315 Individual M also serves as an officer of his firm and the
plan’s investment adviser.316 Individual M is also a general partner
and 7.5% owner of the partnership, T Ltd.317 At question was a loan
between T Ltd. and Individual M & Co., in which the plan was also
an investor.318 The IRS ruled that Individual M was a fiduciary as he
was an investment adviser under the plan.319 Due to his ownership
interest in T Ltd., there was a conflict of interest between the plan
and the partnership, resulting in Individual M having divided loyalties with a plan for which he was a fiduciary.320 Thus, his recommendation to loan monies to T Ltd. by Individual M through Individual
M & Co. violated I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E).321
The case of Rollins v. Comm’r illustrates that plan assets may be
used for the benefit of a disqualified person, violating I.R.C. §
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4975(c)(1)(D), even if none of the plan assets were transferred to the
disqualified person.322 In the case, Mr. Rollins caused his wholly
owned company’s I.R.C. § 401(k) plan to lend monies to three entities
in which he had minority interests.323 The court noted that “[t]ransactions were uses by petitioner or for petitioner’s benefit, of assets
of the [p]lan.” Here, the petitioner derived a benefit (as he was a significant part owner of each of the borrowers) “from the [b]orrower’s
securing financing without having to deal with independent lenders.”324
In the case of Rutland v. Comm’r, the plan in turn leased the property to the employer, MMR.325 The Tax Court affirmed the IRS’ findings that (1) the sale of property by the officers who were disqualified
persons by virtue of I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(H) constituted a prohibited
transaction under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A), and (2) the subsequent lease
of such property by the plan to the employer, MMR, who was a disqualified person by virtue of I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(C) constituted a prohibited transaction under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B).326 The court remarked that the prohibited transaction rules were designed “to
guard against particular instances of over-reaching by a person able
to exert influence over the affairs of such a plan” by charging an excessive price for the property or charging an excessive interest rate
under the terms of a loan.327
In the case of D.E.W. Plumbing Inc., v. Domestic Mortgage, Inc.,
Fishman, as trustee and plan administrator to the plan, with the
power to invest the plan assets, lent plan assets to Domestic Mortgage, a company owned and controlled by Fishman and his two children.328 The court held Fishman to be a fiduciary due to his positions
as trustee and plan administrator, and due to his discretionary authority or control over the plan assets.329 Domestic Mortgage was
held to be a party in interest as it was 50% or more owned by Fishman and his lineal descendants, pursuant to the rules of ERISA §
3(14)(G).330 Thus, the plan engaged in a prohibited transaction with

322. Rollins v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-260.
323. Id. at 2-4.
324. Id. at 10.
325. Rutland v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 1137, 1139-41 (1987).
326. Id. at 1147.
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Domestic Mortgage as an impermissible loan or transfer.331
The case of Etter v. J. Pease Construction Company, Inc. demonstrates problems that can arise when the plan engages in a joint investment with someone associated with the plan.332 Etter, a plan participant of a company-sponsored pension plan, sued the company’s
president Jack Pease, the plan, and the plan trustees for engaging in
prohibited transactions.333 The plan loaned monies to a business acquaintance of Pease, who partnered with him in three property developments.334 The plan then purchased a 37% interest in a real estate
venture, along with Pease and Miller (trustees to the plan) purchasing 56% and 7% respectively, for a total ownership interest of
100%.335 The plan realized a profit of 97% on its investment over an
18-month period.336 Etter argued the plan’s investment in the venture
on two grounds: (1) that is was a prohibited transaction, and (2) that
the trustees breached their fiduciary duty to diversify.337 The court
responded by saying that “prohibited transactions do not per se
mandate a remedy,” and since the plan made a profit, there were no
damages.338 Etter then claimed the plan’s investment in the venture
constituted a use of the plan’s assets for the benefit of a party in interest, thereby violating 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D), as Pease and Miller
were both plan trustees and personal investors in the venture.339 Etter
notes that Pease had sufficient personal assets to purchase the land
and that both Peace and Miller benefitted from the plan’s investment
as it secured for them tax advantages while not risking their personal
assets; conversely, the defendants argued that by contributing less
than 100% of the purchase price, the trustees enabled the plan to take
advantage of a “valuable opportunity.”340 The appellate court found
the two views permissible, thereby affirming the district court’s account as “plausible,” and thus, not reversing it.341
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IRA Investments in Real Estate
In the case of In re Cherwenka, the debtor was in the business of
“flipping” houses through a company named Goldmine Properties
Inc. (GPI) and operated at a profit until the real estate crash of 2008.342
He established a self-directed IRA with Pensco, whose assets included real property.343 The debtor identified property suitable for
the IRA and reviewed the closing statements and related documents.344 After the property was purchased, the debtor engaged with
contractors to improve the property, and inspected and confirmed
the completion of the work before the property was sold, with the
profits retained by the IRA.345 The debtor was not compensated for
any of the work done in connection with the rehab of the property.346
A creditor of GPI alleged that the debtor engaged in prohibited transactions involving his IRA and thus, the IRA lost its exemption status.347
The bankruptcy court rejected the creditor’s claim that the
debtor’s activities regarding the IRA’s real estate assets constituted
as direct or indirect services between the IRA and the debtor under
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(C), finding that the debtor had not engaged in any
“transactions.”348 The court said the term “transaction” required an
exchange of goods or services and that the debtor did not receive anything (e.g., in the form of money, discount, or other personal benefit) for his services other than the asset appreciation of the properties.349 Finding no evidence to demonstrate that the debtor’s activities
regarding the IRA properties resulted in “any benefit to Debtor outside of the plan,” there was no basis for finding prohibited transactions.350 The court also rejected the creditor’s reliance on the case of
In re Williams,351 which involved similar facts because the debtor engaged in work on the properties held by the IRA, but there the IRA
owner’s services were compensated by payment to his wholly-

343. In re Cherwenka, 508 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014).
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owned entity.352 The facts in this case showed no form of payment to
the debtor or to any of his wholly-owned entities in exchange for the
alleged work or services on the properties held by the IRA.353
The bankruptcy court also rejected the creditor’s argument that
there was a prohibited transaction due to the purported co-ownership of the prepetition property by the debtor (or a wholly-owned
LLC) (55%) and his IRA (45%), as debtor is alleged to have used or
benefited from the plan’s interest in the property.354 As each party to
the property had a defined, apportioned piece of the property, the
court found no evidence or viable theory to show that the debtor benefited from the IRA’s property.355 The court found the DOL’s Opinion No. 2000-10A instructive, in which the DOL did not find a per se
prohibited transaction where an IRA purchased a 39.85% interest in
a limited partnership, in which the IRA owner’s general partnership
interest was 6.5%.356 The partnership was not a disqualified person
under I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G) because the IRA owner only owned 6.5%
of the partnership.357 Thus, the IRA’s purchase of the interest in the
partnership was not a sale or exchange prohibited under I.R.C. §
4975(c)(1)(A).358 In that opinion, the DOL remarked that it does not
generally opine on the whether the transaction violates the fiduciary
prohibited transactions due to its factual nature.359 However, the
DOL noted that the facts of the request indicated that the IRA owner
does not and will not receive any compensation from the partnership, nor any compensation by virtual of the IRA’s investment in the
partnership, indicating that it may answer the question differently if
he did receive compensation.360 The bankruptcy court then concludes
that the IRA owner’s and IRA’s apportioned ownership in real property is not a per se prohibited transaction.361
IRA Transactions in the Context of Estate Planning
In DOL Adv. Op. 2009-02A, Mr. Goldberg requested a ruling
from the DOL regarding whether his estate planning arrangement in
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handling benefit distributions would trigger a prohibited transaction.362 Mr. Goldberg established a revocable trust for the sole benefit
of his grandson, which would by its terms become irrevocable upon
his death.363 Mr. Goldberg was trustee of the trust, with his son as
successor trustee.364 Under Mr. Goldberg’s IRA, the beneficiary was
designated to be the trust, with the grandson as the identifiable trust
beneficiary.365 Individual trustee statutory commissions would be
paid to the trustee or successor trustee pursuant to state law.366 Mr.
Goldberg queried of the DOL whether the IRA distributions to the
trust and payment of the statutory commissions associated with
those distributions constituted prohibited transactions.367
In reviewing the facts, the DOL opined that both Mr. Goldberg,
his son, and his grandson were disqualified persons as Mr. Goldberg
had discretionary authority to control and direct the IRA’s investments; the son upon becoming a trustee would also be fiduciary due
to such discretionary authority; and the son and grandson were family members of a fiduciary.368
As the attribution rules would attribute the grandson’s 100%
beneficial ownership to his grandfather who is a fiduciary, the trust
is also a disqualified person, as at least 50% of the beneficial ownership of the trust is owned directly or indirectly by a fiduciary.369 Despite the trust being a disqualified person, the DOL held that neither
the benefit distribution from the IRA in accordance with its terms,
nor the trust’s receipt of the benefit distribution, would be prohibited
transactions due to the statutory exemption contained in I.R.C. §
4975(d)(9), which permits participants or beneficiaries to receive benefits under the terms of the plan.370 And although the IRA owner was
a fiduciary to the IRA, not all decisions made by the IRA owner
would necessarily be fiduciary decisions, including the decision as to
whether to make a permissible benefit distribution.371
As to the payment of the statutory trustee commissions, the

362. Op. Dep’t of Labor No. 2009-02A (Sept. 28, 2009).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. (relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lockheed Corp. v. Sprink, 517
U.S. 882 (1996), that the payment of benefits was not a “transaction” for purposes of
ERISA § 406).
371. Id.

2020]

THE PERILS OF SELF-DIRECTED IRAs

73

DOL’s view was that a decision by the IRA owner to adopt an estate
planning arrangement that contemplates permissible IRA distributions being made to a separate non-IRA trust, was not a fiduciary act
by the IRA owner, involving the use of the plan’s income or assets
for purposes of the fiduciary prohibited transactions.372 A similar result would occur when his son became a successor trustee, provided
the IRA distributions were determined and paid on a basis consistent
with the Code and the terms of the IRA.373 However, if the son were
to act as the IRA’s fiduciary (e.g., rendering investment advice to the
IRA owner), he could be held as engaging in fiduciary prohibited
transactions if he made an IRA distribution and transferred the proceeds to a vehicle that would benefit the fiduciary.374
PLAN ASSETS RULES
The term “plan assets” is not defined in ERISA nor the Code
even though its definition is central to who is a fiduciary to the plan
and who is an investment manager. What constitutes plan assets is
also critical in the prohibited transaction context – the issue is
whether such term includes the underlying assets held by entities in
which a plan invests. For example, if an IRA were to purchase a share
of stock issued by a corporation, the plan asset could constitute solely
of the share of stock it purchased or it could include an undivided
interest in the assets owned by the corporation. The DOL has answered this question generally in favor of the first interpretation, but
not in all situations.
In Interpretive Bulletin 75-2 (“I.B. 75-2”), the DOL first addressed the issue as to what constitutes plan assets.375 It set forth the
general view in subsection of (a) of I.B. 75-2 that investment by the
plan in securities of a corporation or partnership would not, solely
by reason of the investment, be considered an investment of the underlying assets of the corporation or partnership for purposes of
making them “plan assets” of the investing plan.376 The concern was
that a plan, while appearing to invest its assets in a separate entity,
was actually attempting to retain the person who manage the separate entity to provide investment management services to the plan.
If that was the case, the assets of the separate entity would be deemed
to be plan assets (i.e., the look-through rule), and if the person
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Id.
Id.
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2(c) (2020).
29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2(a) (2020).
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exercised authority or control with respect to the management or disposition of those assets, he would be a fiduciary of the investing plan.
Subsection (c) of I.B. 75-2, which is still good law, describes two
circumstances in which a prohibited transaction could occur between
a corporation or partnership in which the plan has invested and a
party in interest to the plan, even though the corporation or partnership would not be considered to hold plan assets: (1) if the plan invested in the corporation or partnership as part of an arrangement that
the corporation or partnership would engage in a prohibited transaction (e.g., lending of money to a party in interest), the purchase
would be a prohibited transaction regardless of whether the corporation’s or partnership’s assets were deemed to be plan assets; and
(2) if the transaction between a party in interest and the plan would
have been prohibited, then a transaction between the party in interest
and the corporation or partnership would be prohibited if the party
in interest (and its affiliates), with the aid of the plan but no other party,
could require the entity to enter into the transaction.377 Thus, the
transaction is prohibited if the plan itself is involved or if the party
in interest is involved (with the aid of the plan but no other party)
requiring the entity to enter into the transaction.
In 1986, the DOL published its final plan asset regulations, revising and superseding most of the rules of I.B. 75-2.378 The purpose
of the regulations was to set forth rules to be used to determine when
an arrangement was an indirect provision of investment management services, and if it is, then bring such arrangement within the
purview of ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.379 The regulations begin
with the caveat that if a plan invests in debt instruments, the underlying assets of those instruments are not plan assets.380 Thus, it is only
equity instruments that could be subject to the look-through rule.
The regulations state the presumption that when a plan invests
in another entity, the plan’s assets include such investment, but do
not solely because of the investment, include any of the underlying

377. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2(c) (2020).
378. Final Regulation Relating to the Definition of Plan Assets, 51 Fed. Reg. 41262,
41280 (proposed Nov. 13, 1986) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101).
379. Id. at 41270. (noting that the exception to the look-through rule for plan investments in operating companies was to distinguish between entities that carried on
an active trade or business, and thus not likely entities designed to provide investment management services).
380. Id. 29 § C.F.R. 2510.3-101(b), defined “debt instrument” as an “instrument
that is treated as indebtedness under applicable local law and which has no substantial equity features.” Id. at § C.F.R. 2510.3-101(b)(1). A profits interest in a partnership,
an undivided ownership interest in property, and a beneficial interest in a trust are
equity interests
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assets of the entity.381 But the regulations then negate such a statement by saying that the underlying assets of the entity in which a
plan makes an equity investment will be plan assets unless: (1) the
entity is an operating company or (2) equity participation in the entity by benefit plan investors is not significant.382 Hence, if the underlying assets of the entity become plan assets because the entity is not
an operating company or equity participation in the entity is not significant, this not only expands the potential for prohibited transactions involving such plan assets, but any person who exercises authority or control over the management or disposition of such assets,
and any person providing investment advice with respect to such assets for a fee, becomes a fiduciary of the investing plan, expanding
the cast of characters who could be held to be engaging in prohibited
transactions.383
There are three exceptions under the plan regulations when the
assets of a separate entity will not be deemed to be plan assets: (1)
publicly offered securities exception; (2) operating companies exception; and (3) the significant participation exception (referred as the
25% test).384 A publicly offered security is a security that is freely
transferrable, part of a class of securities that is widely held, and registered under specified section of the federal securities law.385 The
term “widely held” is defined to include securities that must be held
by at least 100 investors who are independent of the issuer and one
another.386 The intent of the exception for publicly offered securities
was to guarantee that fund managers would not become “inadvertent ERISA fiduciaries” with respect to a given plan investment.387
Under the operating company exception, the DOL defines an
operating company as either (1) an entity primarily engaged, directly
or through a majority owned subsidiary or subsidiaries, in the production or sale of a product or service other than the investment of
capital; a venture capital operating company (“VCOC”); or a real

381. 29 § C.F.R. 2510.3-101(a)(2) (2020).
382. Id.
383. Id. In the Preamble to the regulations, the DOL states that the regulations do
not alter the determination of whether a person is a fiduciary with respect to such
assets, under the standards set forth in ERISA § 3(21) and its regulations, including
Interpretative Bulletins 75-5 and 75-8; Id. at 41 Fed. Reg. 41279.
384. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(a)(2) (2019).
385. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(b)(2) (2019).
386. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(b)(3) (2019).
387. Plan Asset Regulations, pmbl., 51 Fed. Reg. 41,261, 41,267 (Nov. 13, 1986). In
the words of the DOL, “[t]he manager of a publicly-offered entity typically is not able
to control plan investment in the entity and often is not readily able to determine
whether a particular investor is, or is not, a plan.”
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estate operating company (“REOC”). A traditional operating company is defined as one that primarily is engaged in the production or
sale of a product or service (other than the investment of capital),
something that the DOL says is inherently factual in nature.388 While
such a determination may be easy to ascertain in most situations, it
becomes more difficult when the entity is engaged in both traditional
business activities and investment fund activities. Under the regulations, two components of a VCOC include: (1) an asset test, such that
it must invest at least 50% of its assets, valued at cost, in operating
companies (other than other VCOCs) in which it has contractual
rights to participate in management and (2) a management test, such
that it exercises its management rights with respect to one or more of
the operating companies in which it invests.389 Under the regulations,
two components of a REOC include: (1) an asset test, such that is
must invest at least 50% of its assets, value at cost, in real estate that
is actively managed or developed, and in which it has the right to
substantially participate directly in the management or development
activities and (2) a management test, such that it actually engages directly in real estate management or development activities.390
Under the 25% exception, if equity participation in a given entity by “benefit plan investors” is less than 25%, the underlying assets
of the entity will not be deemed to be plan assets.391 The DOL’s rationale was that if benefit plan investors have less than a 25% equity
interest in a given entity, it is unlikely that the entity actually solicited plan investors or that the plan investors believed that the entity
would be managed to further a particular investment objective.392
The definition of “benefit plan investors” includes an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA § 3(3) whether or not it is subject to Title I of ERISA; any plan described in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(1); and
any entity whose underlying assets include plan assets by virtue of
the plan’s investment in the entity.393 For purposes of determining
the 25% test, the following persons are not considered: persons (other

388. Plan Asset Regulations, pmbl., 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,263, 41,271 (whether an entity is an operating company is a “factual question to be resolved taking into account
the particular characteristics of the entity under consideration”).
388. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(d) (2019).
390. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(e) (2019).
391. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(f)(1) (2019).
392. Plan Asset Regulations, pmbl. 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,269 (“The exception should
only apply where plan investment is not so substantial that any special solicitation of
plan investments is likely to have occurred and where there is no reasonable expectation that the investment policies of the entity will be affected by the special objectives of the plan investors.”)
393. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(f)(2) (2019).
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than benefit plan investors) who have discretionary authority or control with respect to the assets of the entity; who provide investment
advice for a fee with respect to such assets; or who is an affiliate of
such persons.394 In the Preamble, the DOL explains that it excluded
the equity interests held by an entity’s managers and their affiliates
because “the [significant participation] test could be easily manipulated so as to avoid a determination that plan investment is significant, even where plans provide a substantial degree of the entity’s
capital and constitute most of the outside investors in the entity.”395
There are special rules under the regulations such that certain
specialized entities are always deemed to hold plan assets. These entities include group trusts; a common or collective trust fund of a
bank; certain insurance company separate accounts; and any entity
in which a plan or related group of plans own all of the entity’s equity interests.396
For an investment fund sponsor seeking to raise monies from
pension funds, it will seek to qualify for the operating company exception or restrict investment by benefit plan investors to satisfy the
25% test. If those exceptions are unavailable, the fund’s assets will be
held to include plan assets of each ERISA plan that invests in the
fund, resulting in the fund manager becoming a fiduciary with respect to each investor. The fund manager would then become a party
in interest (and disqualified person) with respect to the plans, due to
being a fiduciary and a service provider, as well as its employees,
officers, directors, majority-owned subsidiaries and other affiliates.
A recently discussed DOL Adv. Op. 2000-10A shows the application of the plan asset regulations. In that opinion, an IRA owner
directed his IRA to invest in a limited partnership in which he and
his relatives were invested.397 After the IRA’s investment, the IRA’s
interest in the family partnership would be 39.38%; the IRA’s owner
‘s interest is 6.52%; his son’s interest is 3.07%; and his daughter’s interest is 1.35%.398 Due to the IRA’s investment in the family partnership (i.e., 39.38%), there was a significant investment (25% or more)
in the partnership by benefit plan investors (i.e., the IRA, as a plan
described in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(1)), and thus the partnership is deemed
to hold plan assets.399 This results in any person who exercises

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(f)(1) (2019).
Plan Asset Regulations, pmbl, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41, 269.
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(h) (2019).
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Advisory Op. 2000-10A (July 27, 2000).
Id.
Id.
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discretionary authority or control with respect to the assets of the
partnership to be a fiduciary of the IRA and thus, subject to the prohibited transaction rules.
VALUATION ISSUES
Since our phrase “alternative assets” generally includes nonmarketable securities, debt instruments, partnerships, LLC, privately
held corporations, real estate, etc., these assets will be inherently difficult to value. The Code, regulations, and tax forms address who is
responsible for reporting the annual fair market values of IRA assets.
I.R.C. § 408(i) requires the trustee or issuer of the IRA to report certain information both to the individuals for whom the accounts are
maintained and to the IRS.400 The information to be reported is determined by the IRS and must be satisfied no later than January 31 of
the calendar year following the calendar year to which the report relates.401 Such reported information includes the fair market value of
the assets held in the account at the end of the calendar year and is
reported on the annual Form 5498, which is filed with the IRS by May
31 of the following year.
Under the regulations that oversee approval for non-bank custodians, they state “[t]he applicant will determine the value of the
assets held by it at least once in each calendar year and no more than
18 months after the preceding valuation. The assets will be valued at
their fair market value, except that the assets of an employee pension
benefit plan to which section 103(b)(3)(A) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(3)(A)) applies
will be considered to have the value in the most recent annual report
of the plan.”402 Thus, it puts the responsibility of valuation on the
non-bank custodian. The Instructions to Forms 5498 and 1099-R confirm that “[t]rustees and custodians are responsible for ensuring that
all IRA assets (including those not traded on established markets or
with otherwise readily determinable market value) are valued annually at their fair market value.”403
This begs the question as to whether the trustee or custodian can
rely on the IRA owner’s valuation of the assets. The Retirement

400. I.R.C. § 408(i).
401. I.R.C. § 408(i)(2)(A).
402. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(e)(5)(ii)(E) (2020).
403. See 2020 Instructions to Forms 1099-R and 5498, https://www.irs.gov/pub
/irs-pdf/i1099r.pdf. Failure to comply with the requirements for Form 5498 is $50
per failure per I.R.C. § 6693; failure to comply with the requirements for Form 1099R is $100 per failure per I.R.C. §§ 6721, 6722.
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Industry Trust Association (“RITA”) is a non-profit national trade
group comprising of federally- and state- regulated banks and trust
companies that engage in the custody or administration of more than
400,000 retirement accounts holding more than $55 billion in assets.404 In its letter to the DOL regarding its proposed regulations redefining a fiduciary, RITA urged the DOL to clarify that directed custodians and non-discretionary trustees of self-directed IRAs should
not be treated as fiduciaries by reason of the valuation reports custodians provide to IRA owners.405 While custodians of IRAs are required to provide annual valuations under the Code, including assets for which there is no generally recognized markets, they
generally rely on the values provided by third parties, such as investment providers and investment managers. To strengthen its argument, RITA attached a 1993 letter from Tom Brisendine, then Chief
of Branch 1 (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations) of the
IRS.406 In that letter, Tom Brisendine stated “so long as the trustee
reports the information that it receives from the partners [as to what
the FMV of the assets is] it is under no obligation to appraise the investment independently. However, if this information is unreasonable on its face, a trustee may want to re-evaluate whether to continue
in a fiduciary relationship with the partnership . . .. Even if the general partners are not forthcoming with the fair market value information, the trustees who are obligated to report FMV do not have to
determine value independently to fulfill their obligation under the
Code … trustees who call the IRS seeking information on how to get
a reasonable FMV from uncooperative general partners are told not
to deal with these people on a fiduciary basis in the future unless the
partnership agrees to re-appraise its assets periodically, under written contract.”407 Thus, informal IRS guidance appears to suggest that
the custodian can rely upon the IRA owner’s valuation unless it is
unreasonable on its face.
One court affirmed this position, by finding that the custodian
only had to “provide” the IRA owner with the fair market value, but
that the IRA owner had a duty, in the self-directed IRA context, to
404. See Letter from Tom W. Anderson, President, and Mary L. Mohr, Executive
Director, of the Retirement Industry Trust Association, to the Office of Regulations
and Interpretations, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR (Jan. 26, 2011) https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/lawsand-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB32/00065.pdf.
405. Id.
406. Letter from Tom Brisendine, then Chief of Branch 1 (Employee Benefits and
Exempt Organizations) of the IRS, to the Retirement Industry Trust Association (Aug.
6, 1993).
407. Id.
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find an independent third-party to perform the fair market valuation.408 There are also two recent Tax Court decisions in which the
IRA custodian distributed and issued 1099-Rs at cost when the IRA
owner failed to provided valuation information. In Berks v. Comm’r,
the IRA owners invested in five different partnerships in exchange
for promissory notes, upon the advice of their financial adviser, Mr.
Blazer.409 The partnerships all failed for various reasons and the
promissory notes held in the IRA accounts became worthless.410
Based on Mr. Blazer’s statements that the investments were worthless, the IRA owner informed the custodian to terminate the accounts.411 The custodian refused to terminate the accounts based on
Mr. Blazer’s statements.412 The IRS clearly regards the closing of an
IRA account and the writing down its investments’ value as a “red
flag” such that the owners could avoid taking taxable distributions
from the account.413 As the IRA custodian requested documentation
regard the investments’ value and when it received none, it resigned
and distributed the account based on the original investment
amounts, not the owners’ declared “worthless” value, with Forms
1099-R.414 The Tax Court affirmed the IRS’ determination of a tax deficiency and an accuracy-related penalty under I.R.C. 6662(a) for underpayment.415 The Tax Court stated, “… [the IRA owner] simply
took Mr. Blazer at his word, and they apparently never saw the need
to request any documentation that would substantiate that the partnerships had failed or that the promissory notes in the IRA accounts
had become worthless.”416 Thus, without sufficient documentation,
the IRA owners failed to meet their burden of producing credible evidence or reasonable dispute with respect to the Forms 1099-R that
the custodian issued.417 A similar result is found in Gist v. Comm’r.418
These cases highlight the importance of properly documenting any
loss to the IRA assets for the IRA custodian.

408. See Levine v. Entrust Group, Inc., No. C12-03959, 2013 WL 2606407, at *4
(N.D. Cal. June 11, 2013), aff’d 621 Fed. Appx. 461 (9th Cir. 2015).
409. Berks v. Comm’r, No. 26883-11S, 2014 WL 37642, at *2-*3 (T.C. Jan. 6, 2014).
410. Id. at 3.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 4.
414. Id. at 3-4.
415. Id. at 6.
416. Id. at 5.
417. Id.
418. See Gist v. Comm’r, No. 16065-12S, 2014 WL 37646, at *4 (T.C. Jan. 6, 2014).
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TITLING ISSUES AND CUSTODY OF ASSETS
Undoubtedly the IRA is “owned” by the person who established it and contributed property to it. But title of the IRA is in the
name of the trustee or custodian. If the IRA is a trust, which it should
be based on the language of I.R.C. § 408(a) which states it is a “trust
created or organized in the United States.”419 When an IRA invests in
an alternative asset, it can invest in the asset directly or indirectly
through an entity. If it invests directly, the investment is titled
“[Name of Custodian], Custodian FBO John Smith IRA Account No.
12345.” Alternatively, the IRA can invest in an entity (e.g., LLC),
which then in turn does the direct investing. The advantages of using
an entity as the investment purchaser includes speed, privacy, and
convenience as other parties may be more willing to engage in a
transaction with an LLC rather than an IRA. A question not yet resolved is whether the IRA can own an entity that is managed by
someone not eligible to act as an IRA sponsor (e.g., bank or custodian) and not violate I.R.C. § 408(a)(2) (requiring the IRA to be a trust
where the trustee is a bank). “Checkbook control” refers to the LLC
establishing a checking account by its general manager in the name
of the LLC with a tax ID number (EIN). The IRA owner then controls
the checkbook so as to purchase assets through the LLC, in lieu of
using the trustee or custodian to purchase the investments. Presumably, this gives the IRA owner more control over the investments of
the IRA, with reduced administrative and transaction fees, and faster
processing of transactions. This appears to be a popular approach
when the IRA owner wishes to invest in real assets.
The IRS has yet to opine of the checkbook LLC approach. The
question is who holds the IRA assets – as the regulations state that the
custodial account will be treated as a trust for purposes of I.R.C. §
408(a)(2) “if the assets of such account are held by a bank … or [approved non-bank custodian].”420 Advocates of the checkbook LLC
approach take the position that the IRA assets are the shares of the
LLC, which are held by the bank, and that the checkbook is that of
the LLC, not the IRA. This question also arises in the context of investing in certain gold, silver, or platinum coins, and for certain gold,
silver or platinum bullion. The statute is clear that in the context of
bullion, it must be “in the physical possession of a trustee described

419. I.R.C § 408(a).
420. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(d) (2020) (in the case of a custodial account being treated
as a trust because it satisfies the requirements of I.R.C. § 408(a) and the assets are held
by the trustee, the custodian of the account will be treated as trustee).
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under subsection (a) of this section,” but silent as to whether the trustee must be in physical possession in the context of coins.421 Given
that there is no statutory or regulatory authority for a trustee or custodian to be able to delegate its authority for someone else (including
the IRA owner), it would be problematic for someone else to hold
coins owned by the IRA in the hands of someone other than the trustee or custodian. Should the IRA owner himself have physical possession of the coins, this may violate the rule against commingling
personal and IRA assets set forth in I.R.C. § 408(a)(5). Custody of digital currencies is even more problematic for IRA owners.
UNRELATED BUSINESS TAXABLE INCOME (UBTI) TAX
In the context of self-directed IRAs in alternative investments,
two other considerations must be addressed: unrelated business taxable income tax (UBTI) and unrelated debt financed income (UDFI).
Under I.R.C. § 408(e)(1), IRAs are normally exempt from taxation unless the account ceases to be an IRA.422 However, the IRA will be subject to tax imposed under I.R.C. § 511 on net business income generated from a trade or business regularly carried on by the IRA.423 The
rationale is to prohibit the IRA from a tax shelter for business activities not substantially related to the performance of its exempt purposes (i.e., which is to provide a vehicle for retirement savings). Under I.R.C. § 511, the tax imposed on an IRA’s net business income is
at the trust income tax rates.424 I.R.C. § 512(a) provides that “except
as otherwise provided in this subsection, the term ‘unrelated business taxable income’ means the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business … regularly carried on
by it, less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly
connected with the carrying on of such trade or business . . ..”425 Under the modifications of I.R.C. § 512(b), many types of income are
excluded: dividends, interest, annuities, royalties, most recent from
real property, and gains from the sale, exchange or other disposition
of property other than inventory or property held for sale in the ordinary course of a trade or business.426 For example, if the IRA were
to invest in a partnership which deals in the purchase and sale of real
estate which generates income in the ordinary course of business,

421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

I.R.C. § 408(m)(3)(B).
I.R.C. § 408(e)(1).
Id.
I.R.C. § 511(b)(1) (subjecting the tax to the rates in I.R.C. § 1(e)).
I.R.C. § 512(a).
I.R.C. § 512(b)(1)-(5).
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such income would be taxable to the IRA. As a result, the IRA would
need a checking account to process and pay such taxes. The tax is
reported by the IRA owner on Form 990-T;427 see IRS Publication 598
regarding UBTI.428 While many IRA trust and custodial arrangements state that the responsibility for filing Form 990-T is with the
IRA owner, the instructions to the form indicate that the fiduciary to
the trust is the one responsible for the filing.429
I.R.C. § 512(b)(4) provides that UBTI includes any income on
debt-financed property (as defined in I.R.C. § 514).430 “Debt-financed
property” is defined as property which is held to produce income
and which is subject to borrowing (either for the original purchase or
for improvements).431 Debt that is acquired for short-term liquidity
needs (i.e., less than 12 months) is exempt.432 Income on debt-financed property is subject to taxation but only with respect to the
financed portion of the property.433 For example, an IRA purchases
real estate worth $1,000,000, which is debt financed with a $500,000
mortgage (e.g., the real estate is a leveraged asset held by the IRA to
produce income); only 50% of the rental income from the property is
subject to UBTI. In addition, any proportionate share of the gains on
the profit from the sale of a leverage asset are also subject to tax, unless the debt was paid off more than 12 months prior to the sale.434
Such tax is owed by the IRA, not the IRA owner, and thus must be
paid by the IRA. Should the IRA owner pay the taxes instead, the
payment would likely be treated as an excess contribution, subject to
excise taxes.435
The potential for UBTI taxes raises concerns that the IRA remain
relatively liquid in order to pay such taxes. Once the IRA owner
reaches age 70-½ and becomes subject to the annual required minimum distribution requirements, the IRA will need sufficient liquidity to disburse such payments.
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Form 990-T, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990t.pdf.
See IRS Publication 598, https://www.irs.gov/publications/p598.
See Instructions to Form 990-T, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990t.pdf.
I.R.C. § 512b)(4).
I.R.C. § 514(b)(1).
I.R.C. § 514(b).
I.R.C. §514(b)(1).
I.R.C § 514(b).
I.R.C. § 4973 imposes a 6% excise tax on “excess contributions” to an IRA.
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CONCLUSION
The recent GAO reports highlight the significance of self-directed IRAs investing in alternative assets, as such IRAs are subject
to a host of legal impediments that could jeopardize the tax-exempt
status of the IRA. The prohibited transaction rules appear to impose
significant limitations on self-directed IRAs investing in transactions
involving other family members; impermissible loans or other extensions of credit to entities having a relationship with the IRA owner
or his family members; transactions with family businesses or other
entities related to the IRA owner; and investments in real estate.
Given both the DOL’s and IRS’ reluctance to opine on whether a
given transaction runs afoul of the fiduciary prohibited transaction
rules due to the inherently factual nature of such transactions, the
2019 GAO report highlighted the importance of the DOL and IRS in
communicating with one another to provide greater education to
IRA owners. Other legal impediments facing self-directed IRAs investing in alternative assets consist of the DOL’s plan assets regulations; the valuation of such alternative assets for purposes of IRS annual reporting; whether delegation of the custody of IRA assets can
be made by the IRA trustee or custodian; and other related federal
taxes applicable to an IRA that engages in a trade or business unrelated to the original purposes of the IRA. What should be apparent
by the end of this article to any sophisticated IRA owner is that investing in alternative assets requires the expertise of an employee
benefits attorney conversant with the rules applicable to IRAs. As
running afoul of the prohibited transaction rules can subject the IRA
to immediate disqualification, the consequences are severe and permanent.

